


NORTH AMERICA
DURING THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY



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T. CROCKETT
AND
B. C. WALLIS



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NORTH AMERICA
DURING THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY



U.S. Hist

A GEOGRAPHICAL HISTORY

BY

T. CROCKETT, M.A. Edin.

AND

B. C. WALLIS, B.Sc. (Econ.) Lond.

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PREFACE

THE story of the rise of the United States to nationhood has been frequently told, but we think that it merits repetition from the point of view which dominates this book, the limitation of the course of events throughout a great historical period imposed by the geographical conditions of the time and place.

It is not possible to acknowledge our indebtedness to all the sources from which we have obtained ideas and facts and it did not seem wise to overload the book with footnotes. While we record, in this general way, our obligations to many writers and teachers, we may be allowed to mention specifically the works of Francis Parkman—notably his *Montcalm and Wolfe* as a source of inspiration—and the series of *Historic Highways of America*, by A. B. Hulbert, as a mine of topographical and historical facts.

We are grateful to the Syndics of the Cambridge University Press for permission to use Figs. 13, 15 and 18 and to the Census Bureau of the United States for Fig. 22. The sketch maps have been specially drawn with a view to providing in a simple form the equivalent of a teacher's black-board sketches.

As a study in the geographical view of history we have ventured to allow a conception of the inevitableness which characterises the march of events upon a large scale to dominate the story as we have told it.

T. C.

B. C. W.

LONDON,

June, 1915

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CHAPTER I

SURFACE AND CLIMATE OF EASTERN NORTH AMERICA

THE Atlantic coast of North America to the north-east of Cape Hatteras is far from regular, being indented by Chesapeake Bay, Delaware Bay, the estuary of the Hudson River, the Bay of Fundy and the estuary of the St Lawrence. From the above-mentioned cape there extends inland for about a hundred miles a belt of coastal lowland which decreases in width towards the north until it is finally limited to the land between the Chesapeake and Delaware Bays, while still farther north the narrow valleys of the Hudson and the Connecticut contain the only land below the hundred-foot level. In the south the land along parallel 35° N. extends about three hundred miles inland before a height of 2000 feet is reached, and the area lying between this line, the coast and the Potomac River forms a triangle with sides three hundred miles long, all of it less than 2000 feet above sea-level, and sloping gradually from the west down to the coast.

In a north-easterly direction from the Potomac the lowland is much cut up by low ranges of hills, which as a rule run in lines parallel to the coast, and in the troughs between these hills many streams wind their tortuous way seaward. North-eastward from the Hudson River the streams run in the main athwart the trend of the hills and at right angles to the coast, so that the ridges of this region lie between valleys which run more or less north and south. So much for the coastal region.




Fig. 1. The Relief of North-eastern America.

B. C. W. Sc.

Inland lies the Appalachian Plateau, the escarpments of which are definitely named as mountain ranges. In the south the Blue Ridge first, the Alleghany Mountains next, and other smaller but parallel ridges rise up from the plateau, which is everywhere more than 2000 feet high. West of the triangular lowland the ridges sometimes attain a height of a mile above sea-level, but towards the north the highlands consist of separate elevated parts, such as the Catskills, the Adirondacks, the Green and the White Mountains. To the west the plateau gradually slopes away towards Lakes Erie and Ontario, the slope being narrowest in the north-east. It is difficult to over-estimate the serious nature of the obstruction to human movement which this jumble of impassable ridges presented to the early white inhabitants of the American coastal plains. No engineers had been at work to discover the easy gradients and smooth the ways for the traveller; no road-maker had made easier the passage of vehicles; and the mere masses of highland represented, as it were, a definite wall to the migration of large bodies of men and women westward. But the obstacle of elevation was the greater by reason of the vegetation which in the wildness of untamed nature clothed the slopes and crowned the ridges. The forest, half as old as Time, with the tangled undergrowth of countless summers, was only here and there pierced by the tracks which the Indians had made across the ridges, and travellers were wont to use the rivers and streams as much as possible, and only traversed the darkened forest glades when the water-routes were no longer negotiable. Further, the whole area was covered in winter with a permanent mantle of snow, for during that season the climate is harsh in the extreme, the winter lasting from November till early April.

To return to the orographical description of the plateau. The water-parting between the rivers which flow westward and those which make for the Atlantic Ocean keeps about

two hundred miles from the coast, and approaches the Great Lakes in the north-east. This is due to the fact that the rivers cut through the plateau's eastern scarps and pass between the gridiron formation of ridges along longitudinal valleys, and finally break from the Appalachian uplands to take an almost direct course to the sea, exceptions to this rule being the Hudson River and others farther to the north-east. The Potomac, the Susquehanna and the Delaware, with their tributaries, all flow in the troughs between the gridiron ridges. On the west of the plateau the Monongahela flows in a northerly direction to join the Allegheny in its southward course from near the eastern end of Lake Erie, and the united stream then flows south-west as the Ohio River to meet the Mississippi (*Oyo* is the Indian for *beautiful*, and the French called the stream *La Belle Rivière*). The Ohio runs almost parallel to the Appalachians, from which the Great Kanawha and the Youghiogheny flow as tributaries of the Ohio and the Monongahela respectively. One other river, the Mohawk, is important; it joins the Hudson at the hundred-foot level, having come eastward from the water-parting close to the eastern shore of Lake Ontario, and the water-route through the Hudson-Mohawk lowlands was of supreme importance. These features are shown in Fig. 1.

The whole area is bounded on the north by the Lakes and the River St Lawrence, which is joined almost due north of the Hudson valley by the Ottawa, flowing in a parallel direction to that of the Mohawk.

The records of the modern meteorologist enable us to divide this region into four distinct portions in relation to the changes of temperature experienced. These four areas are: (1) the whole of the St Lawrence valley, (2) the upper portions of the Ohio valley, (3) the whole length of the highland, and (4) the coastal plain. In all these regions the temperatures become less rigorous in a direction




Fig. 2. Climatic Variations in North-eastern America.

B. C. W. Sc.

III and IV indicate the areas where there are three or four months both before and after mid-January during which night frosts are possible.

from north-east to south-west: Fig. 2 shows in a general way the actual march of winter. In the St Lawrence valley from the end of November till the end of February everything lies in the grip of the frost-king, and wherever the hills occur the period of frost begins earlier and ends later, while near the river-mouth the frosts continue from the end of October until April. The Ohio valley is largely free from frosts except on the higher portions of the valley-slopes both to north and south. The uplands in the north-east have frosts with accompanying snow, beyond the Hudson from November to March, in the middle portion for the three months from December to February, and in the south, where the elevation is greater, only in January. The coastal plains are on the whole the warmest areas, but in latitudes north of New York there is a severe three months' winter, and only south of Chesapeake Bay does the average temperature of the coldest month remain above freezing point.

In relation to the climate of England, as we know it, this summary of the winter conditions means that even in the warmest areas the temperature from November till the end of March is consistently colder, by as much as ten degrees, than the temperatures which we experience, so that even on the coastal plains south of the Chesapeake there is a possibility of many days of continuous temperatures below freezing point. These facts, generalised upon Fig. 2, interpreted in terms of human experience, mean that the hills are permanently snow-clad, and the snow does not melt away rapidly until the winter season is at an end; the rivers and streams are usually frozen¹ except where the rush of moving water is too rapid for it to freeze; the St Lawrence is un-navigable from the third week in November until April; the ground is hard and agricultural work

¹ The Hudson is sometimes frozen so hard as to provide a highway into Albany.

is impossible. Shelter from these winter conditions is all-important in the selection of sites for farm-buildings, and cattle require constant care during the winter months. Even the warmest regions of the hills have winter conditions resembling those of the Grampians.

Added to the low temperatures of the winter season is the difficulty which travellers meet in the winter storms. The whole of the area is regularly swept by movements of air from the north-west towards the Atlantic. Coming from a region of much more intense cold, where on that account the air contains little moisture, dry cold currents of air sweep every valley and gully of the hills which face these winds, and every comparatively easy way over the uplands is exposed to them before they finish their land journey across the coastal plains. The winter winds are therefore penetrating, but dry and bracing, and although their effects are terrible when they blow as blizzards, this part of America is free from the cold dampness of the winter days which makes us feel more acutely the severity of English weather.

In the summer months from June to the end of August practically the whole area has higher temperatures than prevail in England. Even the elevated areas of the uplands have temperatures above 60° F., and the coastal plains have temperatures at least ten degrees higher. As in the winter, the climate is colder towards the north-east, but the difference in temperature between the extreme north-east and the far south-west is not nearly so marked.

With regard to the control which these summer conditions exert upon the life of man, it must be noted first of all that the change from the severe winter to the comparatively warm summer is more noticeable than that in England, and it takes place more quickly. The heat of midsummer is so much greater than in England that in the large cities of the district it is frequently too hot for the people to sleep

indoors during the summer nights. Vegetation which grows quickly is therefore favoured by these conditions, and the habits of the people are exemplified by the fact that American houses are heated throughout during winter and are surrounded by verandahs as shields from the strong summer sunshine.

The summer winds reach eastern America from the interior of the continent and are therefore as dry as during the winter, so that, except in the valley of the St Lawrence during the winter months, the whole of eastern North America has clearer skies and therefore a higher proportion of the possible sunshine than we have in England. During the summer the high temperatures which are recorded are enhanced by the brilliance of the sunshine due to the comparatively cloudless sky.

In general, the rainfall is greater in summer than in winter, the period from October to April having less precipitation (whether as rain or snow) than that from May to September. Variations of course occur, but the following particulars bear out the above statement. The Ohio valley and Piedmont experience their heaviest rainfall in June-July and in August respectively, the former period being also the wettest along the Appalachians. Again, October is the driest month on the Ohio and November in Piedmont, though April and June are the dry months for the New England hills in the one case and the New England lowland in the other. It should be noted that in Piedmont the total annual rainfall is over 40 inches, while in the Ohio and St Lawrence valleys it is from 30 to 40 inches.

SUMMARY OF CHAPTER I

Eastern North America consists of a dissected plateau called the Appalachian Region, with slopes south-eastward to an embayed coastline, and north-westward to the river-beds of the Ohio and the St Lawrence. The embayed coastline indicates that the land is

encroaching upon the sea, so that since the days of the early settlers the coastal flats have become less marshy. Between the Ohio and Lake Erie is a gentle rise of land which drops rather suddenly to the shore of the lake. The plateau is trenched by many rivers which have steep-sided valleys; the chief trench is that of the Hudson River and




Fig. 3. Photograph of a Relief Model of the Hudson-Mohawk Valleys.

Lake Champlain, with its lateral trench westward, that of the Mohawk. These trenched river valleys are clearly indicated in Fig. 3.

Human wanderings across the plateau have always been attended with difficulty. In the old days the traveller, who dared to find his way from the marshy coastal plains beyond the forested uplands,

10 EARLY EXPLORATION AND SETTLEMENT [CH.

endured privations such as travellers in the twentieth century encounter in the heart of South America or in the wilds of the frozen polar regions.

In winter the air is cold and usually dry, but the snow lies for many weeks, and drifts into the gullies and river-trenches; the streams are frequently frozen or covered with loose floating ice. In summer the air is very hot, and rain-storms are frequent, so that the lowlands remain swampy, and hill-roads are preferred to valley-tracks. Compared with Britain, the slopes of the land are steeper, the climate is much colder in winter and also very much hotter in summer, while the winter snow mantles the ground to greater depths and for longer periods than even in the rawest and coldest parts of Scotland.

CHAPTER II


EARLY EXPLORATION AND SETTLEMENT OF EASTERN NORTH AMERICA

IN 1497, five years after the famous Italian Columbus reached as he thought the Spice Islands of which he was in search, and so gave Spain a footing in the New World, John Cabot, another Italian, led an English expedition to America and discovered Newfoundland and Labrador. These lands were revisited in 1500 by a Portuguese slave-hunter, Cortoreal, who doubtless profited more by the cargo of slaves which he shipped from Labrador than did Cabot by the present of ten pounds which Henry VII of England made him for his information concerning the rich fisheries off Newfoundland. These fisheries began to be exploited by French, English, Spanish and Portuguese about the time that Cortoreal made his survey, and the unofficial visits of French fishermen were supplemented in 1524 by an expedition which Francis I despatched under the Italian Verrazzano: this navigator, however, after vainly trying for six weeks to find a passage to the Pacific, abandoned

the quest when his provisions ran short, and ten years elapsed before the next French expedition crossed the Atlantic.

Jacques Cartier, a Breton, made his first voyage to the west in 1534, reaching the Gulf of St Lawrence; in the next year he sailed 500 miles up the river of that name to the spot where Quebec now stands, whence he pushed on by boat 150 miles further to the Royal Mount; on the occasion of Cartier's third voyage in 1541, a clearing was made above Quebec, but the settlers departed with the arrival of spring. Equally unsuccessful was the attempt of Roberval, a French noble, to establish a permanent colony in the two succeeding years. Farther south, Captain Ribaut of Dieppe planted in Florida a colony of Huguenot precursors of the Pilgrim Fathers, which was exterminated in 1564 by the Spaniards, jealous of any "claim-jumping," though in all likelihood the lack of energy which the colonists displayed would of itself have led to the ultimate failure of the enterprise. Meanwhile the Spaniards, one of whose number, de Soto, discovered the Mississippi in 1542, found that the methods which had answered so well against the less sturdy natives of South America were ineffective north of the Gulf of Mexico, and the only claim which Spain could lay to territory north of that point (with the exception of the peninsula of Florida¹) was based on theory alone; now her claim had never been admitted by England, so that, when Sir Humphrey Gilbert, the half-brother of Sir Walter Raleigh, was authorised in 1578 to take in England's name "any lands not possessed by any Christian prince or people," he regarded North America as a virgin field for annexation and settlement.

¹ Discovered in 1512 by Juan Ponce de Leon, explored by de Soto in 1539, and retained by Spain till 1763, when it was ceded to England in exchange for Cuba; handed over to Spain in 1783, and purchased by the United States in 1819.



B. C. W. Sc.

Fig. 4. Early Exploration and Settlement.

- | | | | | | | | |
|---|----------------|---|---------------|---|---------------|---|------------------|
| A | Maine | B | Massachusetts | C | Connecticut | D | Rhode |
| | Island | | | E | New Hampshire | F | Manhattan Island |
| G | Lachine Rapids | H | Pennsylvania. | | | | |

During the period which witnessed those explorations and unsuccessful attempts at colonisation, European fishermen had continued to visit the Newfoundland fishing grounds, and had established cosmopolitan communities of a temporary nature on shore, the lawlessness of which gave Gilbert an excuse, if he wanted one at all, for proclaiming Newfoundland England's first colony, and settling two companies of colonists there. This was the beginning of the colonisation of North America, and the years 1579 and 1583 mark the commencement of a fresh stage in the relations of that continent with Europe: for till that time the visits of the white man were those of the slave-hunter, plunderer and treasure-hunter, explorer and cartographer, rather than those of the true coloniser. Richard Hakluyt, the common friend of Gilbert and Raleigh, shares with them the credit of having first entertained the idea of an English colonial empire; all advocated for reasons partly political and partly economic the drafting of England's excess population to those parts of America where the climatic conditions were suitable; and, while Gilbert's attempts at settlement failed, their non-success was due, not to mistaken motives on the part of their promoter, but to the lust for gold and intolerance of the more prosaic pursuits of life which afflicted his followers. The plantation of Munster in 1580 with some men of Devon was Raleigh's first effort at colonisation, and this he followed up by five expeditions to Virginia, but these, while absorbing his fortune, failed to result in permanent settlement, the attacks of Indians or fruitless efforts to find precious metals ending in the extermination or departure of the pioneers. Compared with his aims, the net results of Raleigh's energy were small: the introduction of tobacco into England, the acquisition of the potato by the farmers on his Irish estates, and the transfer of the charter obtained by him from Queen Elizabeth to a body of Plymouth merchants. These founded a company for the development of a district

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farther north than that to which Raleigh had devoted his attention, news of the more favoured land having arrived in 1602. The company was in two sections, with headquarters at Plymouth and London, and the latter section sent off a body of intending settlers who landed at James River in 1607. The old disturbing notions about possible gold bade fair to be the undoing of these visionaries till the practical John Smith imposed the teachings of common sense on his fellow-colonists and guided them successfully through the trying times of the settlement's youth.

The Dutch now began to take a share in the work of opening up the country whose importance men were beginning to realise, New Amsterdam—afterwards New York—being founded by them in 1614 on Manhattan Island. When the Pilgrim Fathers sailed for America in 1620, Dutch trading stations already existed on the very territory which these Puritan adventurers had obtained from the London Company, between the Delaware and the Hudson. The Pilgrims, however, actually settled at Plymouth on Cape Cod Bay, for the captain of the *Mayflower* made the American coast farther north than he had intended, and, so he alleged, the weather would not permit of his proceeding southward. The next sixteen years witnessed the settlement of districts which were afterwards known as the colonies of Massachusetts, Maine and New Hampshire, Connecticut and Rhode Island. A fuller account of the origin of these colonies will be given later: it is sufficient to say here that Massachusetts was the expansion of a settlement made at Cape Ann in 1623, Maine and New Hampshire arose out of the development of the coast strip north of the Merrimac by a member of the (English) Plymouth Company, the title to Connecticut was made good by New England fur-traders at the expense of the Dutch, while Rhode Island owed its existence to religious trouble in Massachusetts.

In the meantime Samuel de Champlain, "the father

of Canadian colonisation," was busy establishing France as a power to be reckoned with in America. From the first his ambition was the exploration of the west, but in 1604 his superior, de Monts, overruled him and founded Port Royal in Acadia, but de Champlain managed to found Quebec in 1608, subsequently supporting the Huron Indians against the Iroquois in return for the help of the former in his schemes of exploration. The enmity of the latter mighty tribe was thus turned against the French, and Quebec and Montreal, which was founded in 1632, were merely oases of precarious safety in a desert of savagery till the statesmanship of Louis XIV's minister, Colbert, galvanised the colony into forcible aggression, and the resultant conquests paved the way for the exploration and annexation of the country round the Great Lakes. At first the path of progress was up the Ottawa River to Lake Nipissing, thence to Lake Huron, and from the latter lake southward to the western end of Lake Erie. The French Canadians later overcame their objections to the Lachine Rapids¹ on the St Lawrence above Montreal, and passed to Lake Ontario, and thence slowly into Lake Erie, but circumstances prevented them from knowing Lake Erie until long after they were familiar with the Ottawa route. From the area of the Great Lakes French adventurers began to push south, and in 1673 Joliet and Marquette reached the Mississippi from Lake Michigan, while nine years later La Salle reached the same river from the Illinois, voyaged down it to the sea, and proclaimed the whole river-basin French territory under the name of Louisiana.

Other competitors had appeared in the field. Henry Hudson in 1609 discovered the river which bears his name, while he was in the Dutch service, and, as has been mentioned, his masters founded New Amsterdam five years later; and

¹ So called because they were believed to lie on the road to China.

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this settlement was the nucleus of the New Netherlands, captured by Britain in 1664 and ceded to her in 1667¹. The cession included territory—New Sweden—occupied by a body of Swedish emigrants settled by Gustavus Adolphus in 1638, and absorbed by the Dutch in 1655. Part of the tract thus acquired by the British became the province of Pennsylvania (1681), and the effect of the conquest was to link up Virginia with the New England colonies. An attempt was made as early as 1613 to extend British rule into the French Acadia, and the peninsula was granted to Sir William Alexander by James I in 1621, but his plantation of Nova Scotia was a failure, and Charles I restored the territory to France in return for the dowry which he obtained with his queen, Henrietta Maria. It subsequently changed hands four times before 1713, when by the treaty of Utrecht Britain acquired Nova Scotia, Newfoundland and the Hudson Bay territory, which had been secured by d'Urville about 1680 from the English traders there; Cape Breton Island, however, continued to be held by France till 1763. The loss of Acadia, which was one of the granaries of Canada, was particularly irritating to the French Canadians, and its recapture was long their cherished ambition.

SUMMARY OF CHAPTER II

- 1497 Cabot discovered Newfoundland and Labrador.
- 1500 *circa* European fishermen began to frequent the Newfoundland fishing-grounds, establishing cosmopolitan communities on the shores of the Gulf of St Lawrence.
- 1535 Cartier sailed up the St Lawrence to the site of Quebec.
- 1579 Newfoundland was established as England's first colony.
- 1583 *onwards* Raleigh's five expeditions to Virginia.

¹ In 1673 the Dutch, again at war with Britain, reconquered the territory with the exception of certain towns on Long Island founded by English settlers, but held it for less than a year, when it was restored to Britain by the treaty of Westminster, 1674.

- 1607 Settlement of Virginia by the London Company.
1608 de Champlain founded Quebec.
1673 Joliet and Marquette reached the Mississippi from Lake Michigan.
1674 Final cession of the Dutch colonies to Great Britain, by which the Virginian settlements were united to New England.

During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries English, French and Dutch made explorations and settlements in North America. The settlements lined the coasts and the banks of the Hudson and St Lawrence Rivers. The plateau kept men apart and the settlements were determined by three chief factors: (1) nearness to the Atlantic Ocean, so that supplies from Europe and additional settlers were the more easily obtained; (2) the question of food-supplies, the fish of the Grand Banks, and the farms of the lowlands, chained men down; (3) the rigours of the winter throughout the area, and especially north of the St Lawrence, caused the settlers to congregate along lines of easy communication, and drove out all but the hardiest.


Yet, in addition to the settlers, adventurous spirits carried on the work of exploration, and intercourse with the Indians, allied to the profits of the fur-trade, limited these explorations to the valley of the St Lawrence and the Great Lakes.

During these two centuries the European in America was dependent upon water communication; the sailing vessel of a few hundred tons brought him across the ocean, the clumsy wide rowing-boat bore him along the rivers and the streams, and the birch-bark canoe carried him venturously into the unknown interior. It was an Age of Boats.

CHAPTER III

FRENCH AND BRITISH

BEFORE proceeding to trace in detail the conflict of British and French in North America, we must have a clear idea of the geographical factors and territorial claims which influenced both sides in the struggle. In the first half of the eighteenth century the land from about 34° N. to the Gulf of St Lawrence, and west to the Mississippi, was very



B. C. W. Sc.

Fig. 5. Early Routes and Settlements.

K. Kaskaskia.

sparsely inhabited by three peoples. In the St Lawrence valley were the French immigrants, along the coast and extending from twenty to a hundred miles inland were the British colonies in which were established also Dutch, Swedish and German settlers, while between the two lay the indigenous North American Indians.

The French were interested mainly in the fur-trade, and for this reason had many scattered trading posts. Their line of advance had led them from their chief town, Quebec, along the St Lawrence to Montreal, and thence, as we have noted, in two directions; first, by the River Ottawa to Lake Huron, and second, by the Lachine Rapids to Lakes Ontario and Erie. Louisiana had been founded in 1697, and New Orleans in 1718, while the whole territory was declared a royal province in 1732. Now the French trade-route between Montreal and New Orleans was twice shifted eastward. By the first change it proceeded *via* Lakes Ontario and Erie instead of Lakes Huron and Michigan, and then along what is now the eastern border of Illinois, instead of the western as formerly, to the Mississippi. Another change was effected about 1750 when the new trade-route *via* the Ohio River was opened up between the east end of Lake Erie and the Mississippi. What were the reasons for the French anxiety to establish a continental right of way between their northern and southern possessions? The answer is three-fold: in the first place, France was scheming to obtain a great colonial possession, partly at Britain's expense, and her first link between north and south was a step in the process: in the second, since Canada had to depend on districts outside her own borders for food-supplies, her inhabitants being trappers and traders rather than husbandmen, she had to make certain of undisturbed possession of her corn-land in the Kaskaskia valley, situated in the fork formed by the Mississippi and the Ohio, which is now the southern part of the state of

Illinois; this was achieved by the opening up of the second route: and lastly, France aimed at acquiring complete control over the western fur-trade, which she did when the third route was pushed through. One reason why the shortest route was the last to be adopted has already been indicated, the other was the hostility of the Iroquois Indians towards the French, who had allied themselves with the Hurons, the former tribe thus receiving a direct inducement to make common cause with the British against the French, who were accordingly forced to make a long *détour* to escape Indian attacks. Against this danger, and to make good their territorial claims against British advance, the French constructed various forts along the routes which they followed, and other forts were built on the lines of communication between French and British territory, the British in their turn taking precisely similar steps.

Let us now turn our attention to the nature of the British colonial possessions. These lay first in scattered plantations along the coast, and for some little distance inland extended the region known as the Settlements. In the dissected area toward the north-west the settlers reproduced within limits the agricultural communities which they had left in the mother-country, and the colony of Pennsylvania may be regarded as having been the granary of British North America. On the triangular lowland the coastal settlements were usually tobacco plantations, and in this respect lay the importance of Virginia, which imported numbers of negro slaves to do the manual work on these plantations. Tobacco is a short-period crop, and is grown during the three warmest months, June, July and August. The crop requires about twelve inches of rainfall; hence it is grown during the rainy season, and is harvested immediately the drier weather sets in. The growing plant is, also, seriously injured by frost; consequently the Virginians who produced tobacco were left with many

months of leisure, which allowed them to indulge in social life. Such settlers, with negro servants, tended to maintain the attributes of easy upper-class life in England, and Virginia was the aristocratic colony. So the Virginians were in contrast to the sturdy New Englanders, who were compelled to live arduous toilsome lives, since their crops left them little leisure. No modern colonies reproduce the conditions of Virginian life, but the modern settler in the heart of Canada, who lacks leisure and lacks servants, is a modern example of the early New Englander.

The coastal settlements as a rule consisted of cleared woodland, and as the line of habitations extended farther inland, it was always at the expense of the forest, which at that time was fairly dense. Now the rate of expansion was considerable, for tobacco exhausts the soil very rapidly indeed, and the growers found it easier and cheaper to break up fresh land than to fertilise that already impoverished. In Virginia, west of the Settlements, lay the cattle-rearing district of the Cowpens, where a homestead would carry from four hundred to a thousand head of cattle, which roamed wild in the woods. The newly-born calves with their mothers were rounded up and branded in March, and in September those cattle which were required for sale were gathered into stockades. Still more to the west lay the forest of giant sycamores, oaks, chestnuts and elms. These trees were frequently over fourteen feet thick, and so close did they grow that the operation of felling had to be preceded by the clearing away of the top hamper. Through this forest ran certain more or less defined Indian tracks, capable of being followed on horseback, but impassable for any form of wheeled vehicle. British traders and Indians used these ways for trains of pack-horses, and at different points west of the Appalachian Plateau trading stations were established. The Indians themselves, while in the main

hunters, had created permanent camps in fertile spots, where they tilled the ground after a primitive fashion.

In comparing the methods of expansion employed, we notice that the French claimed the river valleys, and the British attempted to acquire the hinterland west of their settlements. The French claimed territory without making any effort to populate it; the British proceeded on a plan of actual colonisation. The movements of the French, who were hunters and traders, were freer than those of the British, who were mainly farmers. The French were actuated in the main by one dominating motive; the British were handicapped by inter-state jealousy and a spirit of independence which made common action difficult. Again, although in the end it proved the wiser course, the latter regarded the Indians with more or less disdain; the French mixed with them, adopted their ways, and treated them as allies rather than as aliens.

The Red Man still held the land from the Great Lakes to the plateau in the middle of the eighteenth century, but in the south-west of Virginia was a region, the Black Forest, almost uninhabited by him and hardly even hunted by the white man before that time, when the French numbered approximately eighty thousand, and the British nearly one and a quarter millions, the former having increased about four-fold and the latter nearly three-fold since 1713. In connection with these numbers, however, it is well to remember that their principal calling gave the French a mobility which sometimes more than counter-balanced the numerical superiority of their rivals.

The reader will have gathered that the French and British lay separate before the year 1750, and they tended to be kept separate by the barrier of the Appalachian Plateau, and more especially by the thick forest with which the plateau and its outlying ridges were clad. In the north, the great connecting link was the Hudson valley,

with the growing town of Montreal at one end, and the town of New York at the other, while a branch of the British settlements extended up the Mohawk valley almost as far west as the water-parting, and here the settlers touched Indian territory.

When the French interests led them into the district between the plateau and the Lakes east of the Rivers Monongahela and Allegheny, the old Indian paths through the forest and over the hills formed possible lines of contact. Here the British gained from the fact that the Rivers Potomac, Shenandoah, Susquehanna and its tributary the Juniata rise near the west of the plateau at no great distance from the sources of the westward-flowing rivers whose waters eventually reach the Ohio (Fig. 1, p. 2). In the troughs between the main mountain range and the eastern ridges of the plateau the rivers had made valleys along which the British settlements were creeping, and from these troughs there ran over the ridges the Indian paths used by the traders.

In the neighbourhood of the Gulf of Mexico were the British and French colonies of the West Indies and the French mainland colony at the mouth of the Mississippi. Now communication between the British colonies was by sea, and many ships left the harbours of British North America laden with timber, horses, salted beef and pork for the use of the sugar planters of the West Indian Islands. On the other hand, communication between the French colonies by sea was longer and more difficult, and there was little exchange of commodities. Consequently the French were drawn towards possible communication by land, and from the Lakes to the Ohio, from the Ohio to the Mississippi, lay a water-route which was bound to prove attractive to the French, who favoured the canoe and the bateau as means of travel. It thus appears that the development of French America lay in progress along inland waterways, while the development of British America was of



necessity along land-routes, for the rivers of the eastern slopes are unsuited to navigation owing to the rapids or falls which obstruct the passage on most of them about the hundred-foot level above the sea.

Everything considered, then, it is tolerably clear that the French were forced to attempt to hem in the British colonies, which were extending inward from the sea, by a belt of French territory which would stretch from the St Lawrence at Quebec to New Orleans at the mouth of the Mississippi, and contain the valley of the Ohio and the land west of the Appalachian Plateau.

SUMMARY OF CHAPTER III

The French were traders and still depended on water transport: they did not farm the land to any great extent, and thus had to rely upon supplies from France, but there was no commerce between the French colonies and any country other than France. The British settled the land and occupied the territory they claimed. The basis of their settlement was their farms, and therefore, as the settlers became more numerous, roads and wheeled vehicles supplemented the rivers and the boats. Their tobacco made trade a necessity, and their forests and cattle gave them goods with which to trade with their sister colony, the British West Indies. Prosperity therefore depended upon steady intercourse with Great Britain and the West Indies, and such intercourse was based upon the steady transformation of virgin lands into farms and plantations.

CHAPTER IV

OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

ACADIA, which had been declared British territory in 1713, continued French in spirit, and the neighbourhood of the French colony of Cape Breton Island encouraged its inhabitants in their attitude of open reluctance to accept

the oath of allegiance to George I or George II, and of active incitement of the Indians to attack not only British trading vessels but also the two posts of Annapolis (formerly Port Royal, but renamed in honour of Queen Anne on its capture in 1713) and Canseau¹. Nor was this attitude weakened when in 1780 they were compelled at last to swear allegiance to George II. Meanwhile from 1720 onward the French put forth great efforts to fortify the new station of Louisbourg, and when Britain and France went to war over the question of the Austrian Succession, the French from that base eagerly seized the opportunity of attacking their British neighbours, Annapolis nearly falling into their hands. But the Governor of Massachusetts, Shirley, with commendable energy and great secrecy organised an expedition against the French fortress, which fell in 1745 after a siege of forty-nine days, and Shirley then proposed a double invasion of Canada.

Now the routes by which such an invasion could be conducted may be traced with ease on a map. The most obvious, of course, was that by sea, while on land there was a choice of two: one was up the Hudson River to Lake George, thence to Lake Champlain, and then down the Richelieu River to the St Lawrence below Montreal; the other was up the Hudson's tributary, the Mohawk, across to Lake Oneida, and thence to Lake Ontario. Shirley proposed to attack Quebec by the first and Montreal by the second route, when the attention of British statesmen was distracted by the Jacobite rebellion of 1745, and the colonials were denied further help, though the West Indian fleet had supported them in their siege of Louisbourg. Left to their own resources, the New Englanders in 1746

¹ The Abbé le Loutre was an utterly unscrupulous and untiring agent in stirring up both French and Indians, terrifying the former by threats of spiritual penalties and encouraging the latter by payments of money.

awaited with apprehension the arrival of a large French fleet, whose departure from La Rochelle the British had



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Fig. 6. The Beginning of Hostilities.

failed to prevent; the expected advent of this fleet encouraged the French, who again pressed forward to the

conquest of Acadia. But the fleet never arrived, for storms did what the British navy might have effected, and when the French made another effort in the next year to send assistance to their American colony, Anson and Hawke destroyed the two fleets which were despatched.

But a cruel blow was to fall on Shirley and his helpers, for by the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748, which brought hostilities to a close, Louisbourg was handed over to the French in exchange for Madras. This was sound imperial statesmanship, for a French Madras meant a French India, while a French Louisbourg was at the worst a thorn in the side of the British in North America. But the colonists had never shown themselves able to think imperially, and their disappointment and dissatisfaction were naturally strong. To make matters worse, the treaty failed to determine the boundary between British and French territory in America. A commission sat at Paris from 1750 to 1754 to deal with the question, but nothing was settled, for the French asserted that, since they possessed the mouths of the Rivers Mississippi and St Lawrence, the whole river-basins were theirs as well, while Britain maintained that since she possessed the coast she must therefore possess the interior. Now it may occur to the reader that, as the valley of the Ganges ought for geographical reasons to be controlled by the power holding the mouth of that river, the Mississippi river-basin on the same principle could be justly claimed by the French who held New Orleans: but it must not be forgotten that Louisiana had a relatively small population, amounting altogether at the most prosperous period of French rule to 7000 only, exclusive of troops, and this despite the fact that an area of 5000 leagues was at the disposal of the colonists; and again, the natural direction for the expansion both of the British settlements and of the principal French one, that of Canada, was westward. Neither side, however, would recede from the

attitude it had adopted, and war was the only arbiter left.

Between the date of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle and the failure of the Anglo-French commission the colonists on both sides had not been idle. In 1749 Céloron de Bienville set out from Quebec on an expedition, the object of which was to establish a French claim to the territory between the Lakes and the Appalachian Plateau. This area was inhabited by a mixed Red Indian population, which was already engaged in trade with Englishmen who had made their appearance in 1748, having crossed the hills, some by the Kanawha River, others by the Potomac valley. Bienville took forty-four days to reach the Allegheny by way of Lakes Ontario and Erie and Chautauqua, the eight miles' portage between the last two, over hilly and densely wooded country, taking seven days; having laid formal claim to the Ohio basin, and registered that claim by nailing to a tree a tin plate, stamped with the arms of France, and burying an inscribed leaden tablet in the earth, Bienville ordered the British traders to quit the Ohio, an order which was cheerfully disregarded, though ostensibly complied with for the moment.

In 1750 this explorer marked on a map the south shore of Lake Erie as "almost unknown"; this lake had only been known since 1669, whereas Huron and Ontario had been known since 1615, Superior since 1629, and Michigan since 1634. The French trading stations therefore were situated at Frontenac on Lake Ontario (the present Kingston), at Niagara on the other side of the same lake—these posts forming the main protection against the Iroquois—at Detroit on the way south from Lake Huron, at Michillimackinac an important strategic position on the straits between Lakes Huron and Michigan, and at Ste. Marie at the entrance to Lake Superior; the old Georgian Bay route being thus well guarded: on the Mississippi was a series of six forts between

New Orleans and the mouth of the Ohio. Opposite Fort Frontenac, on the lake shore of Ontario at the point nearest to the Mohawk valley, the British had erected Fort Oswego.

To return to Bienville; after the completion of his Ohio expedition he was sent to take command at Detroit, which his masters hoped would become the centre of their power in the west: but the difficulty of procuring a sufficient number of settlers prevented the realisation of this hope. One thing was certain: the Ohio was far too familiar to the British, whose presence was intolerable to the French. The latter therefore planned to increase their influence in that quarter and incite the Indians to attack Fort Oswego. Accordingly in 1752 they took a British trading station which Bienville had encountered on his return journey up the Miami valley, and in the next year an expedition under Marin built Fort Presqu'île, where Erie now stands. Similar in construction to many others, it consisted of a square-shaped palisade 120 feet each way, fifteen feet high, made of chestnut logs, with a block-house at each corner. From this point inland Marin had a road wide twenty-one feet wide to the Rivière aux Bœufs (French Creek), a distance of thirteen miles, and at the end a second fort was erected, Fort le Bœuf. Garrisons remaining at these two points, the expedition returned, but Marin again visited the region in 1754 and built a fort at Venango on the Allegheny.

In 1749 the Ohio Company, a body of Virginian gentlemen, had received a royal charter granting them 200,000 acres of the Black Forest between the Monongahela and the Kanawha Rivers, and had sent explorers to survey the district, of whom Gist found that the best route was westward from the Potomac by an old Indian track which went by the name of Nemacolin's Path. The Company erected a fort and trading station at the eastern end of the route at the junction of Will's Creek and the Potomac: this post became known as Fort Cumberland and lay a hundred


miles to the west of the British frontier settlement of Winchester. Meanwhile the British colonists manifested an inability to grasp the serious nature of the coming struggle, even if they understood that a struggle was being forced on them at all. Their indifference is almost incomprehensible unless it be remembered that the colonists were far distant from the scene of these events, that their lives were in the main isolated, that lack of easy communication made anything approaching public opinion almost impossible, that the various colonies were mutually suspicious and disinclined to take common action or incur expense which seemed likely in their eyes to benefit communities other than their own. An exception, however, was found in the Lieutenant-Governor of Virginia, Dinwiddie, who decided to send a messenger to demand the withdrawal of the French from the Ohio valley. He chose for this mission a young man of twenty-one, George Washington.

On November 15, 1753, Washington's party set out from Will's Creek by Nemaquin's Path. The time was winter, the route lay in great measure in hilly country, swamps were numerous, the forests were difficult to traverse through snow, the travellers were drenched to the skin again and again, and the rate of progress was about eighteen miles a day, the journey between Will's Creek and the Monongahela occupying a week. Having reached the spot where that river joins the Allegheny, Washington pressed on to Logstown, where he spent four days negotiating with the Indians, and the next stage of seventy miles to the French fort at Venango took a further four days. Here the French intention of appropriating the Ohio valley was made plain to Washington in terms both boastful and emphatic, when the tongues of his hosts had been loosened by indulgence in wine. Leaving Venango the next day, the young ambassador passed on to the senior French officer at Fort le Boeuf, taking four days for the sixty

miles' journey. He arrived there on December 11, 1753, having travelled 500 miles from the British headquarters at Williamsburg in forty-two days. The party was treated with every courtesy, but the commandant's answer, which he had taken three days to consider, was to the effect that he must remain at his post until he had communicated with the Marquis Duquesne, on whose instructions alone he could retire. On December 16 Washington set out on his return journey, and, under the necessity of pushing on more quickly than his worn-out horses could travel, he accomplished the greater part of the journey on foot. The awful conditions which he and his companion Gist had to face are well illustrated by the following incident. They had expected to find the Allegheny frozen over, but instead encountered a turbulent stream with blocks of floating ice sweeping down its waters. A raft having been constructed, the travellers entrusted themselves to this frail bark, but as it met the full force of the current, return and advance proved alike impossible. Washington himself fell into the icy stream, but regained the raft. Finally they landed on an island in mid-stream where they spent the night in the acutest discomfort. When day broke, however, the river was frozen over, and the hardy adventurers were able to continue on their way, eventually reaching Williamsburg on January 16, 1754.

As a result of Washington's report, Dinwiddie decided to avail himself of the permission, which he and certain other Governors had extracted from the British ministry, to meet force with force, although he could count on no assistance from Britain. Washington was accordingly despatched with a force of 200 men, and he left Will's Creek on April 29, 1754. He followed his former route along Nemacolin's Path, and as they advanced, his men made a road and bridged the streams. Thus was made Washington's Road across the Appalachian Plateau. But the roadmaking was

a cause of delay, and the average daily advance was only two miles. While this work was in hand, the leader made a canoe voyage of reconnaissance along the Youghiogheny, for he was anxious to atone for the repulse of a small body of men who had been engaged in the erection of a fort at the junction of the Monongahela and the Allegheny, where the French had thereafter proceeded to build Fort Duquesne, the site of which is now covered by the city of



Roads Washington, Braddock; - - - - Forbes.

B. C. W. No.

Fig. 7. The First Roads over the Plateau.

- A Fort Bedford B Fort Cumberland C Fort Necessity
D Dunbar's Camp E Fort Ligonier.
Land over 1500 feet above sea-level, black.

Pittsburg. Washington determined on an effort to recapture the position, but the French were kept informed of his movements by their Indian scouts, and an officer called Coulon de Jumonville led a small force to intercept him. This movement was known to Washington, though the precise position of the enemy was a mystery, and for two days they were within five miles of his camp. Finally the French were discovered to be hiding in a ravine on the

eastern side of Laurel Hill, and after a night march of ten miles in five hours the colonial troops attacked them there, killing ten and making the rest prisoners. Washington thereupon returned to Great Meadows where his men spent three days in fortifying a camp which was given the name of Fort Necessity, and the young leader sent east for reinforcements. The roadmaking was not discontinued, and the road was taken on from Great Meadows over Mt Braddock, and eight miles beyond to the west, when the approach of a French force compelled a retreat to Fort Necessity, where the pinch of hunger was keenly felt, for during the last week of the road-construction the colonists had been without bread, and, shut up in the fort, opportunities of procuring additional food of any kind must have been few. On July 3, about five weeks after the defeat of Jumonville, the French and their Indian allies surrounded the fort, and a battle raged all day long in the rain. At eight o'clock in the evening a parley was held with the result that the next day Washington and his men marched out with all the honours of war, and arrived after much suffering at Will's Creek on July 9.

The expedition had been a failure, but its leader had gained valuable experience, and the reverse stimulated Virginia to complete Fort Cumberland at Will's Creek: its dimensions were 200 yards by 40 yards, and its palisade of logs was twelve feet high, with embrasures for twelve guns, ten additional four-pounders being mounted. The Indians, however, had been encouraged by the British repulse, and the Black Forest from the Hudson to beyond the Kanawha was soon swarming with parties on the war-path. They pursued their campaign even under the guns of Fort Cumberland and their activity was increased by payment on the part of the French for every British scalp which they delivered. Not a single British flag waved beyond the Appalachian Plateau, and Fort Cumberland

was left a lonely outpost far in advance of the frontier, a little clearing in a forest wilderness.

SUMMARY OF CHAPTER IV

Traditional hostility between Great Britain and France in Europe manifested itself in America by hostility between the colonists, which was emphasised by the facts that

- (1) British and French expansion both led to the Ohio valley ;
- (2) both nations were dependent upon the fur-trade for their progress westward ;
- (3) the colonies had grown in population and authority until they were able to embark upon hostilities without waiting for permission or help from Europe ;
- (4) the meeting of small parties of both nations in the unpopulated west favoured guerilla warfare.

The French colonies were based upon a reproduction of French ideas and habits, so that the French leaders were aristocrats, and it is noteworthy that opposition to France came chiefly from Virginia, the most aristocratic of the British settlements. The farmers of New England and Pennsylvania were too much occupied with their daily routine to feel the impetus towards expansion which was a dominant idea in the south, so that the farming colonies handicapped Virginia, where the irregular struggle was commenced, Washington, a gentleman of that state, being compelled to traverse the plateau.

CHAPTER V

OFFICIAL WARFARE

DURING all this time France and Great Britain were nominally at peace, but the French in America had learned that the plateau and the forest were not impassable barriers to British expansion or military aggression. Meanwhile the

fortifications of Louisbourg, a mile and a half in circumference, were strengthened. They had been begun in 1720, and more than a million pounds had already been expended upon their construction; no effort had been spared to make them impregnable, and it is said that the lime and even some of the stone had been brought from France. The place had been captured by the New Englanders, as has been mentioned, under Peperall and Warren, and surrendered again to the French by the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, not without protests from those who knew most about Britain's problems in America. The French efforts to strengthen this "Dunkirk of America"¹ led to the British foundation of the naval station of Halifax to the south, and it differed from the other British settlements in that the early settlers were all introduced through the direct effort of the Government, who sent over large numbers of soldiers whom the peace had thrown out of employment. The British post of Canseau was abandoned and Annapolis was neglected in favour of the new Halifax, outside which Acadia was rapidly rendered an almost uninhabitable wilderness where the French farmers were prevented from living quietly under British rule by the prowling bands of savage Indians directed by their equally ferocious missionary leader, le Loutre, whose object it was to make British rule in Acadia, the boundaries of which had been left unsettled by the treaty of 1748, practically non-existent by forcing his fellow-countrymen resident there into a hostile attitude towards their legal masters. At this time the French were also fortifying Crown Point and Ticonderoga in the region of Lake Champlain in the northern part of the narrow valley which lies between Montreal and New York; a large vessel was launched on Lake Ontario, the forts were strengthened, and nothing but the personal influence of an Irishman, Johnson by name, who was settled on the

¹ It has also been called "The Gibraltar of the St Lawrence."



B. C. W. Sc.

Fig. 8. The Beginnings of Official Warfare.

A Crown Point

B Ticonderoga

C Fort William Henry

D Fort Edward.

Mohawk, kept the Iroquois friendly to the British¹: in short, it is evident that the period of peace was most effectively utilised by the French to render Britain's task in the inevitable war as heavy as it was in their power to make it.

At last the British Government decided to vote supplies for the defence of the American colonies, and early in 1755 two British regiments, 1000 men in all, sailed from Cork for Virginia, and while they were at sea, the colonial authorities decided that an attack should be made on the Ohio valley by way of Washington's Road, with Fort Cumberland as a base. This meant that the troops had to pass through Maryland and Virginia where forage and transport waggons were scarce. Even to-day, Maryland, Virginia and West Virginia devote as many acres to wheat as Pennsylvania, while the climate is too warm for oats. Of all the states in this part of North America, Maryland and the Virginias have at the present time the fewest horses and cattle, grassland being relatively scarce. General Braddock, the British commander, arrived at Fort Cumberland on May 10, and a week later the army arrived from the port of debarkation, Alexandria on the Potomac, opposite the spot where now stands Washington, having marched 174 miles in twenty-seven days. The objective of the expedition was Fort Duquesne, whence Braddock intended to proceed to attack Fort Niagara. Braddock had not his troubles to seek. The expected enlistment of colonials did not materialise, although 500 irregulars were obtained who were paid by the British Government. The Virginians had promised supplies of cattle and 200 transport waggons with their teams, but the promise was honoured more in the

¹ The French pointed out to the Indians that the British advance, unlike the French, meant the destruction of the forests and the consequent loss of their hunting-grounds, a fact pretty obvious to the savage mind.

breach than the observance. Much of the food-supply provided was bad and had to be discarded. Finally, however, Benjamin Franklin induced the farmers of Pennsylvania to provide the waggons and horses which were so urgently required for the journey of over a hundred miles across mountain and through forest. Benjamin Franklin and the Pennsylvanians were not always so helpful, for the Quaker colony united to a theoretical disapproval of war a very practical objection to paying for it.

In June the expedition set out on its march under a blazing sun to Fort Duquesne, improving and widening Washington's Road as it went, while all around Indian parties who had been absent during the winter were engaged in their savage pursuit of scalps and plunder. Progress was extremely slow, the transport waggons, when closely drawn up at night, stretching for half a mile, while by day their line extended to four miles, and by June 20 Braddock was at Little Crossings, having covered twenty-four miles in ten days. Many horses had died¹ and the remainder were worked in relays. The men were suffering in health and condition from their unvarying diet of salt meat. Washington, who was Braddock's aide-de-camp, fell ill. Though the woods swarmed with Indians in the French interest, only twelve accompanied the British force. At last, Washington advised that in view of the slow advance and the lateness of the season a forced march should be undertaken with picked men: the bulk of the baggage was therefore left with an officer named Dunbar, and a column of rather more than 1400 pressed forward and by July 3 was within forty miles of Fort Duquesne. Six days later Braddock had crossed the first of the two fords on the Monongahela and was making for the second, already held by his advance-guard. (Fig. 7, p. 32.)

¹ They were fed entirely on leaves, for no grass grew in the Shades of Death, as the forest came to be called.

The commander of the fort, cognisant of his enemies' movements and thunderstruck at the British success in crossing the Appalachians, prepared to evacuate it, the more readily as the summer drought had so reduced the volume of water in the rivers that his reinforcements had been unable to reach him. But a high-spirited French officer, Beaujeu, was stirring up the Indians to a desperate effort. He reconnoitred the fords and chose a place of battle; unstinted ammunition was served out to the Indians at Fort Duquesne; and, followed by his force of yelling braves and enthusiastic Frenchmen, Beaujeu hurried forward to ambuscade the British. But he was too late to carry out his plan; Braddock had passed the ford. Undeterred, the French leader hurriedly disposed his men in the ravines on either side of the twelve-foot road along which Braddock's army was advancing.

Nine miles from the fort the battle, if battle it can be called, took place—on one side, 600 Indians and 200 Europeans, concealed behind trees, bushes and ridges of rock; on the other, a force nearly twice as great, more perfectly disciplined and equally brave: the former scattered, the latter massed together: the firing on one side deliberate and deadly, on the other haphazard and futile! Braddock's colonials wished to fight after their own fashion from behind trees, but their general, accustomed only to the manner of European warfare, sword in hand drove them to their positions. Officers headed attacking parties only to be picked off. Braddock had five horses shot under him. Washington's coat was riddled with bullets. For two hours the unequal contest raged. At last panic seized the ambushed force, they abandoned dead and dying comrades, arms, stores and official papers, and fled, carrying with them the wounded Braddock, along the sixty miles of road to Dunbar's camp, the number killed and wounded as a result of this disaster being 60 per cent. of the entire

force of 1460. Dunbar spiked his guns and retreated, but the Indians preferred booty and scalps to pursuit. During the retreat Braddock died on July 12 and was buried near the site of Washington's Fort Necessity, waggons being driven over the grave that the Indians might not exhume the corpse, and on July 20 Dunbar was back at Fort Cumberland, which in turn was abandoned by the regulars. The Philadelphians had prepared bonfires to celebrate the expected success of the expedition, but the fateful news put an effective stop to any jubilation, for Braddock's defeat, due to the apathy of the colonials themselves and the natural difficulties of the route chosen for him, produced in the Indian mind an added regard for the French and an increased contempt for the British, which resulted in the frontiers of Pennsylvania and Virginia, 500 miles in extent, lying at the mercy of hordes of savages whose depredations, massacres and burnings were a punishment all too obvious for the lack of support which their victims had accorded to the British regular troops. These frontiers it was now the task of Washington to defend with 1500 colonials, responsible work for a young man of twenty-three, and, Dunbar's army having been sent to New York, it was only the advent of winter which saved the colonists from suffering still more at the hands of Indians.

Meanwhile at Quebec the Marquis de Vaudreuil had an available force of 5000 regulars, the Canadian militia, and innumerable Indians. From Braddock's captured papers he learned of the British intention to attack Crown Point, and sent an able soldier, Baron Dieskau, commander of the French troops on Lake Champlain, to defend the threatened post. The British army, composed mainly of colonial troops, was advancing northward from Albany on the Hudson, where they had been encamped in July, under the leadership of Johnson, the Irishman previously mentioned, whose ability to deal with the Indians was so valuable.



B. C. W. Sc.

Fig. 9. The Land of the "Little Lakes."

- | | | |
|----------------------|-----------------------|-------------|
| A Lake Champlain | B Lake George | C R. Hudson |
| D R. Mohawk | E R. Connecticut. | |
| 1 Crown Point | 2 Fort Edward (Lyman) | 3 Albany |
| 4 Fort William Henry | 5 Ticonderoga | 6 Saratoga. |

Land over 1000 feet above sea-level, black.

Compare with Fig. 3, p. 9.

This colonial army halted at a portage where Fort Lyman, later called Fort Edward, was built. Now from that place two Indian trails led to Lake Champlain, one by Lake George, the other by Wood Creek. It was finally decided that the former route should be followed, and the waggons went forward over a rough road which was prepared for them. At the southern end of Lake George, so named by Johnson in honour of the King, Fort William Henry was built between the lake and the forest, a marsh to the east separating it from the road to Fort Edward. While Sir William Johnson was at Fort William Henry, Dieskau moved on from Crown Point with about 3500 men to Ticonderoga, which commanded both the Indian trails northward from Fort Edward. Thence he advanced by canoe with part of his force to South Bay and then by land to within three miles of Fort Edward, in which situation Fort William Henry lay to his north-west. Under pressure from his Indian supporters, Dieskau resolved to attack the British colonials at Lake George, and after a short march along the new road he prepared an ambush into which some 500 of Johnson's men fell. These Americans were discomfited precisely as Braddock had been, and without his excuse of strange conditions: their lack of discipline led to a speedier retreat than Braddock's men had beaten, and the short distance from their base made the slaughter much less: but the incident should not be lost sight of when an estimate of Braddock's responsibility is attempted. Dieskau continued his advance and attacked the fort, but he himself was wounded and captured, and his men retired in confusion, and fled round the ridge which forms the southern end of Lake George and on by water to Ticonderoga, where a fort was erected. This might have been prevented had Johnson made any effort to follow up the advantage he had gained, but he was content with the completion of Fort William Henry, whereupon his force dispersed

to their homes, leaving garrisons behind at the forts which they had built. So the expedition against Crown Point also ended in failure.

The third plan of the year 1755 was an attack on Niagara. Shirley took command and was at Albany at the same time as Johnson. The expedition passed up the Mohawk to the portage across the watershed, where they encountered both swamp and forest, and after twenty days they journeyed by way of Lake Oneida and its rivers to Lake Ontario, where lay their base of operations, Fort Oswego. Stores and provisions, however, had been delayed by the defective transport system and by the desertion of the waggoners when they heard of Braddock's defeat. The third movement against the French, therefore, came to nothing, and communication between Canada and her interior possessions was still open. (Fig. 11, p. 52.)

The fourth objective of the British was the French fort of Beauséjour on the Acadian isthmus. This attack was led by Monekton, the commander of Halifax, and his force was largely a colonial one. But many of the French were but half-hearted defenders, and assistance failed to come from Louisbourg, which was threatened by a British fleet. After comparatively little show of resistance the fort capitulated. The dreaded le Loutre was captured when on his way to France, and this firebrand being safe under lock and key, and Beauséjour in British hands, the French Acadians seemed destined to a more submissive acceptance of British authority, particularly as 6000 of them were transported by British men-of-war to other parts of America; and let readers of *Evangeline* remember that their sympathy for the dispossessed settlers must be tempered by condemnation of the French-Canadian authorities who had forced disloyalty upon them. Of the four widely-distant points of attack, then, the only one which witnessed success was Acadia.

So the campaigns of 1755 closed. The underlying theory had been excellent, for it was argued that the New England colonies would be free to assume the rôle of aggressors when the capture of Crown Point and Beauséjour should rid them of the fear of invasion; the fall of Niagara would isolate the French posts of the Middle West from Canada; and lastly, these posts would fall an easy prey to Braddock and his men. But Braddock's failure had enabled the French to assemble in such force in the north that neither Johnson nor Shirley could succeed. This demonstrates the intimate connection which French mobility had established between their outposts, and at the same time shows the difficulties confronting the British, since the attack on Fort Duquesne was carried out from Virginia, while the northern armies were recruited from New England.

Throughout the winter of 1755-56, time hung heavy on the hands of the garrisons at Forts Oswego, Edward, and William Henry, the only source of excitement being scouting expeditions on skates over Lake George to discover what the French were doing at Ticonderoga. The fort at the last-mentioned place was strengthened, while engineers were also at work doing the same for Niagara and Frontenac. The British also built two forts near the source of the Mohawk, one actually on the river, Fort Williams, and the other, Fort Bull, four miles away across the water-parting; the route to Oswego was thus, in the eyes of the builders, well protected. (Fig. 11, p. 52.)

SUMMARY OF CHAPTER V

Four lines of attack brought French and British into official conflict. The first was based upon Virginian efforts of previous years; but the Virginian settlements were unsuited by their very nature to provide supplies for a regular army, which crawled upon its stomach very slowly along a newly-made forest-road. Premature haste led to disaster and Braddock's death. Pennsylvanian apathy and Virginian

inability were equally punished in the following winter by raiding Indians.

The second and third expeditions, by natural routes through the plateau barrier, were unsuccessful in consequence of the failure of the strategic attack of the first expedition.

The fourth line of attack was based upon naval mobility and was successful. The maritime area south of the Gulf of St Lawrence became definitely British.

Geographically it is to be noted that the dread of the winter cold and the plenitude of the summer rains gave rise to the premature haste which marked Braddock's forced march beyond the plateau. Braddock's arrival in May gave him too little time for effective operations in one short season.

CHAPTER VI

THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR

TOWARDS the middle of 1756 war was declared between Great Britain and France. By that time 800 French ships had been captured by their enemy, while in March of that year a French expedition had attempted the capture of Forts Bull and Williams; the former fell before Johnson could arrive with reinforcements, but the French force then retired, satisfied with their achievement. And well they might be, for not only was the garrison of Fort Bull destroyed almost to a man, but so great a quantity of stores was blown up with the captured fort that the French were enabled to complete their preparations on Lake Ontario unmolested, while the British endeavoured to make good the loss! The Marquis de Montcalm was sent from France to succeed Baron Dieskau in the command of the French forces in America, and was provided with ample stores and over 1000 fresh troops, while Lord Loudon was despatched as British commander-in-chief, preceded by 900 regulars. Montcalm arrived in May, reinforcements were




Fig. 10. **Forts and Block-houses along the Eastern Edge of the Plateau.**
 B. C. W. No.

Forts:—A Allen B Henry C Lebanon D Pomfret E Granville
 F Lowther (Carlisle) G Morris (Shippensburg) H Shirley K Loudon
 L Littleton M Bedford N Cumberland O Lewis X Ligonier
 Y Pitt (Duquesne) Z Chambers.

Block-houses:—Nos. 1 to 17.

Land over 1500 feet above sea-level, black.

Compare the north-east with Fig. 3, p. 9.

sent to Ticonderoga, the most advanced post on the Champlain-Hudson route, and in August the new French general led an expedition against Fort Oswego, the garrison of which had to surrender; fort, stores and shipping were destroyed, and Ontario was again a French lake.

Meantime, before Loudon's arrival, the New Englanders had evolved a four-fold plan of attack. Five thousand men were to attack the Lake forts from the base of Fort Oswego; three thousand were to advance upon Fort Duquesne by way of Braddock's Road; one thousand were to proceed against Crown Point; and two thousand were to make their way by the valley of the Kennebec to the attack of Quebec. Shirley was the prime mover in this matter, but his colleagues finally decided that the numbers for the first expedition should be increased to six, and those for the second to ten thousand men. Loudon, however, disagreed with Shirley, and the difficulty of raising such forces from among colonists whose last desire was to give real practical help led to the abandonment of the schemes in regard to Fort Duquesne and Quebec, and even the plan against the Lake Champlain forts was pushed forward but slowly. Stores were collected and transported by water up the Hudson to Saratoga, thence by land to Upper Falls, by water to Fort Edward, and again by land to Fort William Henry, the convoys being constantly harassed by Indians. On Shirley's orders, stores for Oswego were taken up the Mohawk valley by a New Englander named Bradstreet, and on one of his return journeys to Albany he defeated a French company sent to cut him off, displaying laudable energy and determination in the engagement. But for long Loudon refused to accede to Shirley's request that troops should be sent to Oswego, and when at last he agreed, it was too late, for the expedition heard that Oswego had fallen, and retreated on Fort Edward.

The projected campaign against the Lake forts was

now given up, and Loudon, supported in this by his subordinates Abercrombie and Webb, confined his attention to preparations for an attack on Ticonderoga. The troops built a fleet of boats to carry them down Lake George, and strengthened Forts Edward and William Henry, but no aggressive action on a large scale was undertaken. In the south the Indian outrages continued. To cope with them, the people and governments of Pennsylvania and Virginia gradually developed a system of block-houses and small forts, each containing from thirty to seventy men; these lay along the river valleys and guarded the trails and paths by which the savages reached the settlements. Forts and rivers are shown in Fig. 10, and from the courses of the latter can be inferred the succession of parallel ridges all trending in a north-east south-westerly direction between the settlements and the valley of the Ohio. The forts started in the north-east near the Hudson and their line crossed the Delaware, Susquehanna and Potomac in succession, and, stretching along the frontier, guarded the outlying towns of Carlisle and Shippensburg. The most southerly of these military stations was situated west of Fort Duquesne, but the Indians rarely attacked them, ravaging instead the unprotected homesteads. Their war-parties were largely recruited from a populous native camp at Kittaning between Venango and Fort Duquesne, and on August 30, 1756, an expedition set out from Fort Shirley to rid the settlers of its menace, and by forced marches reached the camp without discovery. The place was captured and burned, and several British prisoners were released and brought back across the mountains.

The winter of 1756-57 was marked by no serious demonstrations on the part of the British, but the unwillingness of the chief towns to provide adequate food and shelter for the troops who had come to their help reflected gravely on their common-sense and goodwill, while the lack of

comfort which the forces endured contributed to their bad health and bad temper, both calculated to prejudice their chances of later success, and many deserted. In judging the colonials we must always keep in mind that the eastern seaward slopes of the United States have been at all times ill-suited to agriculture, save that Pennsylvania is, and was, a good farming district. Even to-day New York State and New England grow practically no wheat, and their rural economy is based largely upon cattle, even pigs and sheep being comparatively scarce.

Before the winter ended, a French expedition was sent by Vaudreuil, the Canadian Governor, to attempt a surprise capture of Fort William Henry, but the vigilance of its garrison prevented anything but the out-buildings from being fired. A snowstorm debarred a further attack, and the column withdrew on snow-shoes over the frozen surface of Lake George.

The main project for the summer of 1757 was an attack on Louisbourg, preparatory to an ascent of the St Lawrence. The British naval convoy, which was expected, did not appear, while the arrival of a French fleet at Louisbourg was reported. Capture by this fleet would have been fatal, but Loudon at last decided to take the risk and sail for Halifax without protection. He arrived safely on June 30, and a British fleet with additional troops put in on July 9, the total number of men at Loudon's disposal being then 11,000, the largest force yet collected in Canada. No advance had been made, however, when news was received that Louisbourg's garrison had been increased, and its harbour defended by a strong fleet. The British admiral made vain attempts to induce the French to risk an engagement at sea, but his fleet was scattered in a gale and some of his ships were wrecked. Accordingly Loudon returned to New York, having accomplished nothing. Meanwhile, these British designs being known to Montcalm,

he had gathered an army together at Ticonderoga by the end of July and was threatening the frontier of New York. His camp extended for four miles along a valley between Lake Champlain and Lake George, and on August 1 Montcalm's army of 10,000 men, four-fifths of them white, passed down Lake George in boats and canoes, and encamped near Fort William Henry, which had been considerably strengthened; much of the forest had been cleared, the lake protected the north, the marsh the east, and ditches were added on the naturally undefended sides. Colonel Munro had there a force of about 2000 men, many of them recruits, and had under his care a considerable number of women and children. Fourteen miles away at Fort Edward lay Webb with a smaller garrison, which it would have been folly to risk in the open against Montcalm's superior numbers, and so Munro had to do without any help from his neighbour, though expectation of some assistance led him to refuse Montcalm's demand to surrender. For a week the better French artillery battered the fort till the British were reduced to absolute impotence, their cannon useless, their ammunition almost exhausted. Munro capitulated, the garrison being granted permission to proceed under escort to Fort Edward. It is a singular commentary on the French incapacity for effective colonisation that they were unable to carry their defeated foes to Canada owing to the lack of food from which they themselves suffered, while they claimed territory sufficient for the needs of the whole of Europe. At the sight of the British marching off unharmed the Indian allies of the French became uncontrollable, and a horrible slaughter ensued, though Montcalm did his utmost to stop it: but before he succeeded over a hundred had been killed. The contents of the fort were carried off by the French to the north, the fort itself was rased to the ground, and Lake George was as much a French lake as Ontario.

The British plans for the next year were the same as before, but the great Pitt was now at the head of affairs, and he replaced the incompetent bunglers who had mismanaged affairs by officers of a far different stamp. Ships, sailors and soldiers from Great Britain were to attack Louisbourg, under the leadership of General Jeffrey Amherst, who was accompanied by the most famous of British officers in America, James Wolfe. Abercrombie, the only officer of the old group to be retained, was to superintend an expedition against Ticonderoga, while Brigadier John Forbes was to make an attack on Fort Duquesne from the south.

Forbes had an army of between six and seven thousand men, and both he and the leader of his advance party, Bouquet, were for long in doubt whether to use Braddock's Road or an Indian trail farther to the north known as the Glade Road. Two considerations made a decision difficult. First, could a military road which would be superior to that of Braddock and Washington be made along this trail? Secondly, the rivalry between Virginia and Pennsylvania being considered, which road was preferable from the point of view of colonial support and equipment? The Glade Road was finally chosen and the work of construction commenced on August 1, 1758. Forbes came to this decision after being assured by his engineers that the new road could be made in time, and because he believed that a road on the top of the upland would be better than the portage road which Braddock had made, and that the new way would be more suited to the movement of large bodies of men than the old route. An additional reason for the preference was that Pennsylvania was at that time the granary of the colonies. Washington on the other hand, who till then had only had experience in the handling of small bodies of men, advocated the road from Virginia, by clearing which indeed he served to withdraw attention from the real line of attack. It is noteworthy that Braddock

when on the march had tried to reach the Glade Road, where he would have been on higher ground, but had failed on account of the impassable ravines. Forbes found that the progress of the roadmaking was seriously retarded by the wet autumn, and in November his army of about 6000 men was at Fort Ligonier. The season was advanced, and the leaders had begun to consider the necessity of wintering at this fort and of continuing the campaign in



Fig. 11. The Mohawk Gap.

B. C. W. Sc.

- | | |
|-----------------------|-------------------------|
| A Lake Ontario | B Lake Oneida |
| C R. Mohawk | D R. Hudson. |
| 1 Albany | 2 Fort Edward |
| 4 Oswego | 5 Fort Williams |
| 7 Fort Bull (Stanwix) | 8 Saratoga. |
| | 3 Fort William Henry |
| | 6 Sir William Johnson's |

Land over 1000 feet above sea-level, black.

Compare Fig. 3, p. 9.

the following year, particularly as the French Governor, Vaudreuil, had sent reinforcements to Fort Duquesne, when news reached the British which caused them to hurry forward. (Fig. 7, p. 32.)

In August Abercrombie had given Bradstreet 3000 men, nearly all colonials, and with these the latter had pushed up the Mohawk valley and on to the place where Oswego had formerly stood. On the twenty-second of the month he

began to cross Lake Ontario, on the twelfth he had landed on the north shore, on the twenty-seventh he was close to Fort Frontenac, and the next day the French surrendered it; their equipment was given up, they themselves were made prisoners of war, and Bradstreet secured nine armed vessels. The capture of Frontenac meant that the French garrisons of the west were cut off from Eastern Canada. The fort was dismantled, and the successful expedition returned to Albany after leaving 1000 men to build and garrison a new fort, Fort Stanwix, at the portage on the watershed near the source of the Mohawk, a fortification designed to take the place of Fort Bull. As a result of these operations, the French lost the command of Lake Ontario, and a flank attack had been successfully made upon the French position at Fort Duquesne.

The news reached the last-mentioned post, and also Forbes at Fort Ligonier, whereupon the British general determined on a rapid advance with 2500 picked men, but he reached his goal to find the French gone and the fort blown up. On November 27 he was able to write from this place giving an account of his success, and he headed his letter Fort Pitt in honour of the statesman who had sent him to America; and from that day Pittsburg has been the name of the important place which commands the valley of the Ohio. The French power in the Ohio valley was broken. Braddock had failed because he had been compelled to make a frontal attack without any help from the north; Forbes succeeded because Bradstreet had broken the French line of communication. The British had now gained command of the two most important places in the French country west of Montreal. The barrier of the Appalachian Plateau and of the Alleghany escarpment, most difficult to pass in the region of the Laurel Hills, had been successfully overcome, and both Braddock's Road and the new Forbes's Road were now of the greatest value as avenues of colonial

expansion, which was at last possible with the retiral of the French and the consequent cessation of Indian raids.

The Section and Plan of a Block-house

REFERENCE.

Fig. 1.


- A. The port holes for Cannon
- B. The trap holes for Muskets
- C. The Door
- D. The fire place
- E. The Ladder of Communication
- F. The Trap Door
- G. The platform that serves as a parapet, and for the Men to step on.

Fig. 2.

The Plan of the Ground Floor

- A. The port holes for Cannon
- B. The fire place
- C. The Door
- D. The platforms

Fig. 1



REFERENCE.

Fig. 3

The Plan of the upper Story

- A. The port holes for Cannon
- B. The fire place
- C. The trap Door
- D. The platform as in the lower Apartment
- E. The Officers Apartment
- F. The Door leading to it
- G. The Window
- H. Holes made in the floor to fire upon the Enemy if they gave possession of the lower Apartments

Fig. 3





Fig. 2



Scale of Feet

Fig. 12. A Block-house, drawn about 1776.

The earlier block-houses frequently lacked cannon.

SUMMARY OF CHAPTER VI

The early years, 1756-57, of the Seven Years' War were marked by (1) French successes, and (2) later British successes along the natural lines of attack.

Munro's capitulation at Fort Edward was balanced by the capture of Kittaning camp. The attack by sea was checked by the arrival of French reinforcements. Bradstreet took Frontenac, and the French thereupon evacuated Fort Duquesne, and Forbes took possession.

Pennsylvania and Virginia had organised a defensive system of block-houses against raiding Indians, but the success of Bradstreet laid open to the colonists routes into the Ohio valley.

Geographically, the events of 1756 indicate that May was too late in the year for British reinforcements and a British general to reach America; the events of the next year indicate the difference between the seasons in Virginia and in New England: Washington found August too late for the continuation of military operations, while the longer winter of New England caused movements of troops to be delayed until May, and the rainy season of June and July postponed active operations until August. Roadmaking was usually possible in Pennsylvania in August and September during the "Indian summer," which succeeds the season of heavy rains, and the Glade Road was a ridge-road and not a valley-track; yet the unexpected autumn rains increased the difficulties of its construction.

CHAPTER VII

LOUISBOURG TO QUEBEC

WHILE Forbes had been laboriously cutting his way through the forest and over the hills, making a road and repairing the ravages of the autumn rains, Admiral Boscawen with a British fleet and Amherst with a force of about 11,000 men were preparing to lay siege to Louisbourg. This fortress was the connecting link between Canada and the French West Indian Islands, the safe refuge of warships

which fought the British men-o'-war in the North Atlantic and preyed on the New England merchant navy. Its harbour is a landlocked bay about eight miles in circumference, the breadth of the mouth being less than a mile, while in the middle of this channel lies Goat Island, which the French had strongly fortified. The town lay on the southern side of the channel, protected on two sides by water and on the third, or land side, defended by the wonderful fortifications of the place, which naturally were strongest on this side. Further, the surrounding country was a howling wilderness of marsh and forest, while the coast for miles presented a frowning rocky front to the Atlantic billows. Even the elements conspired together to handicap the British, for from the third to the eighth of June, 1758, the wind blew so hard that even an unopposed landing would have been out of the question, and as the wind dropped the fog came up. By the eighth, however, all was ready. The spot had been selected for a landing, and demonstrations against three other points were ordered. Wolfe led the main attempt, and in spite of the fire from masked batteries on shore and of barriers of trees placed with their branches outward, a type of defence easily constructed but with difficulty surmounted, his men landed, scaled the rocks, and carried the position at the point of the bayonet. During the next few days guns, material and stores were landed in spite of fog and heavy seas, and the work of bombardment began. Wolfe silenced the battery on Goat Island by June 26, and the work of carrying forward the intrenchments and outworks proceeded slowly but surely - too slowly for Wolfe, who believed that Quebec might be attacked that summer if Louisbourg fell quickly. But Amherst was thorough, the town and the fortifications were battered to pieces, sorties were repulsed, the French ships in the harbour were put out of action, and on July 27 the garrison surrendered unconditionally as prisoners

of war. Later in the summer Wolfe with Admiral Sir Charles Hardy harried the French settlements on the lower St Lawrence, a task most repugnant to the former at all events, but necessarily undertaken to prevent the inhabitants from sending help to Montcalm, who was threatening the northern British colonies.

In the district of the "Little Lakes" Abercrombie was at the old site of Fort William Henry in June, and Montcalm was at Ticonderoga. On July 4 the British army moved in boats down Lake George, the three divisions covering six miles in the narrows, and by noon the next day the army of 16,000 was landed from the boats and began its march towards the southern end of Lake Champlain through the maze of trees. Montcalm had cleared a piece of rising ground about half a mile from the fort, and fortified a camp with an eight-foot barricade of logs, beyond which was a barrier of sharpened branches. The British brigadier Lord Howe, whom Wolfe described as "the most intelligent man among us," was killed in a skirmish, and Abercrombie's men advanced under their incompetent leader. The French defenders numbered 3500, they were well concealed and perfectly protected from musketry or bayonet attack, the attacking force had no cover and was hindered by the tangle of fallen trees which surrounded the camp. Abercrombie, without artillery, hurled his men time after time at the position, when they might have been much better employed in cutting off the French retreat (for Montcalm's force had rations for eight days only), or their leader in awaiting the arrival of his artillery with which the French defences could have been smashed to firewood in a very short time. As it was, in four hours nearly 2000 fell, the 42nd Highlanders, the Black Watch, losing 500 out of 1000 men. The valour of the troops was as unquestionable as the place was impregnable to such an assault, and Abercrombie had to retreat to the south end of Lake George. Here

Amherst arrived in October, and the two generals discussed the possibility of a second attack on Ticonderoga, whose garrison had risen to 12,000, but decided that the season was too far advanced. So ended the only failure of the campaign of 1758. (Fig. 9, p. 41.)

The winter of 1758-59 was a hard one for the French. They had lost command of both ends of the St Lawrence waterway, and only in the region of the Little Lakes had they held their own, and that through the folly of their foes rather than the perfection of their plans; provisions, too, became dearer and there was great distress. By this time the war had developed considerably, the opposing forces were more numerous, the Indians were of less value to either side, the theatre of war was more restricted, and the question now was simply whether the French could hold the St Lawrence from Quebec to Montreal, with their outposts on Lake Champlain. On the north-east and the north-west the British held the lines of attack, and they had never been driven from their base at Albany, from which they could advance by the Mohawk valley or by Lake Champlain towards the St Lawrence. The French outposts were the forts at Niagara, cut off from Eastern Canada by the British occupation of Fort Frontenac, at Quebec on the river, and at Ticonderoga and Crown Point to the south of it.

The principal task set for the summer of 1759 was the capture of Quebec. The rendezvous was the newly obtained Louisbourg, and from the harbour of that once mighty stronghold a force of nearly 9000 men sailed up the St Lawrence. The leader was James Wolfe, and the letters which he wrote at the time show that he had implicit confidence in the troops under his command. In many ways the French were ill-prepared for the attack; the harvest of 1758 had been a failure, and only 400 additional troops were sent from France to strengthen the defence of Canada,

though a supply of ammunition and food arrived in the spring, Montcalm remarking that a little was precious to those who had nothing. The total available French force numbered about 18,000, exclusive of 1200 Indians, and of these Montcalm gathered 15,000 for the defence of Quebec.

The situation in which the French found themselves is interesting. The French settlements were restricted to



Fig. 13. The Siege of Quebec.

the narrow lowlands on the banks of the St. Lawrence. The whole area of the St. Lawrence valley below Montreal is very inclement, and is so unsuited to arable farming that even to-day the chief energies of the people are directed to dairy farming and cheese making, and the population is very scanty. The French settlers had never taken kindly to farming under conditions so very different from those which prevailed in France. The fact that the maritime country of Acadia, with a more genial climate, had become

British meant that French food-supplies were inevitably smaller in quantity just at the time when the reinforced army meant that there were more people to feed. Moreover, the difficulty of the situation was increased by roguery on the part of those who were in charge of the work of feeding the troops.

There was an impression abroad in Canada that no considerable body of troops would be able to ascend the St Lawrence, but Admiral Saunders tricked some Canadian pilots into coming aboard, and, with their forced assistance, coupled with cautious daring on the part of an old tar who piloted the fleet through the (to him) unknown and dangerous Traverse between the lower end of the Isle of Orleans and the mainland, the expedition arrived within sight of Quebec on June 26, Governor Vaudreuil writing, "The enemy have passed sixty ships of war where we dare not risk a vessel of a hundred tons by night and day." Standing on the upper end of the Isle of Orleans, Wolfe looked up stream to where, three miles away, the river narrowed and was overlooked by Quebec upon the heights. Below the city the defending forces were intrenched all along the steep north bank for six miles to the Falls of Montmorenci. Above it, as he was to find, steep cliffs presented an almost unbroken front to the river. The River St Charles entered the St Lawrence under the walls of Quebec, which was thus protected by water on three sides, while on the fourth it was unapproachable save from the west. Wolfe felt that if Quebec were to be taken, speed was imperative; it was fruitless to wait till Amherst with his larger force should have reduced Ticonderoga and journeyed north to his help through several hundred miles of thick forest; for speed was never Amherst's strong point.

First of all Point Levi opposite Quebec was occupied, cannon were mounted, and at a range of less than a mile they proceeded to bring the town about the ears of its

inhabitants. Its possession was no nearer, but inaction was futile, and no other mode of attack was at first possible. But Montcalm, content to wait within his Beauport lines, was as far from defeat as ever. Accordingly Wolfe landed a force on the eastern bank of the Montmorenci River and established a camp there, but he found that it would be impossible to take any large force far enough inland to ford the deep waters of that tributary, and the only result of the occupation was to annoy Montcalm's batteries and compel him to keep a strict watch on his left flank. But nothing could induce the French general to leave his trenches: he was patiently waiting for winter to end the British attack. On July 18, several British ships, protected by the Point Levi batteries, ran the gauntlet of the guns of Quebec, passed into the upper reaches of the river, a feat deemed impossible by the French, and destroyed some hostile shipping there. This necessitated Montcalm's detaching a force of 600 men to guard the cliffs above the town. On the last day of the month Wolfe directed an attack on the Beauport lines from the river, but the unaccountable rashness of the first thousand men who landed led them to rush on the 14,000 intrenched defenders, only to be repulsed with terrible loss, and the attempt ended disastrously. Three days later an expedition was sent up the river to complete the work of destroying the French ships which had taken refuge above Quebec, but they discharged their stores and ammunition, and, thus lightened, sailed up shallow creeks where pursuit was impossible. From some letters captured at this time, however, Wolfe learned of the fall of Crown Point and Niagara.

By this time the British force was reduced to 7000 men fit for service: considerable numbers had to be left at the camps on the Isle of Orleans and Point Levi; time was passing, and all ranks were rapidly becoming less and less efficient, Wolfe himself being seriously ill in August.

At last the plan which proved successful was decided upon. Wolfe had espied a zigzag path up the cliffs of the Anse du Foulon which seemed to offer the means of arriving within striking distance of Quebec. Admiral Saunders and the batteries of Point Levi kept up a fire which led Montcalm to believe that Beauport was the spot selected for attack, while 3600 picked men waited in boats to drop down the river to the Anse du Foulon at midnight. Twice they were challenged in the darkness, but a Highland officer replied in French and the sentinels were deceived into thinking that it was an expected convoy of provisions which was passing. The guard at the head of the chosen path was surprised, the troops were massed on the Plains of Abraham, and on September 13, 1759, the British, behaving with exemplary self-control, defeated a much superior French force, and Quebec was surrendered four days later. Wolfe, as all know, was mortally wounded, as was Montcalm, in the engagement, and so died two brave and upright gentlemen, gallant soldiers both, to whose memory a common monument stands to-day upon the heights which gave to them a common death, and where they won a common fame. Wolfe was buried in Greenwich Parish Church, while Montcalm's dust found a last resting-place in the chapel of the Ursuline Convent in Quebec, where a bursting shell had hollowed a ready grave.

SUMMARY OF CHAPTER VII

The British advance up the St Lawrence, with the subsequent fall of Quebec, lays bare the secret of British success and French failure. The French settlers and the French army were dependent for supplies on (1) France and (2) Acadia. The British attacking force was ultimately based upon naval strength. Slowly, year by year, the maritime route had seen the advance of British power. The loss of Acadia meant the first blow at French authority, the fall of Louisbourg threw the French settlements on their own resources. These resources were scanty for

the settlers themselves, and they were all too poor for the troops which had been poured into Canada. Both parties in the struggle had difficulties over the commissariat, but the area of fertile land in Canada was small in comparison with the extent of the arable land of Pennsylvania, and the climatic conditions were all in favour of the British.

CHAPTER VIII

THE BRITISH TRIUMPH COMPLETE

IN the meantime relief had been sent to Pittsburg, a force had been sent against Niagara, and Amherst reached the site of Fort William Henry towards the end of June with 11,000 men. Here for five successive years British armies had assembled, and here Amherst made his preparations for another advance on Ticonderoga. The army was in motion on Lake George on July 21, and two days later the leader learned that only a small French force had been left at the fort, the main body having retreated on Crown Point, and late on the night of the twenty-sixth the French blew up Ticonderoga: as at Fort Duquesne, they had retreated when threatened on the flank. Amherst took possession, and on August 1 was informed that Crown Point also had been abandoned. He proceeded to the latter place and set his men to build a strong fort there. But he proceeded no farther down Lake Champlain, as the French had four armed vessels on its waters, and he had to wait till he could construct a fleet, a slow operation in view of his shortness of money and the fact that a solitary saw-mill had to prepare all the timber required; the autumn was therefore well advanced before this force was ready.

Prideaux meanwhile had advanced up the Mohawk, strengthened Fort Stanwix, and built a fort at Oswego. He then laid siege to Niagara, to the defence of which

French colonials, traders and Indians, who had gone to attack Pittsburg, were recalled. Prideaux, by the bursting of one of his own guns, was killed, but his successor defeated the French force, and Niagara surrendered: this force had been in garrison at Presqu'île, Venango and le Bruf, and these forts now became British. After the capture of Niagara, Amherst sent Gage to take command on Lake Ontario, with instructions to descend towards Montreal.

Amherst's ships were ready on October 11, and the French vessels offered no resistance, but the autumnal storms had begun, and although some troops were sent forward on the lake they encountered weather so bad that they were recalled, and Amherst devoted himself to the fort at Crown Point, leaving the French fortified at Isle-aux-Noix, on an island in the middle of the Richelieu just where that river leaves Lake Champlain. Amherst's attack, as Wolfe anticipated, thus failed to co-operate with that upon Quebec.

While the commander-in-chief wintered at Crown Point, the British garrison at Quebec under Brigadier Murray, 6000 strong, experienced a very trying time. Stationed in a ruined city in the midst of a desolated country, without adequate clothing, their pay in arrears, they fell a prey to scurvy through want of proper food: the procuring of fuel was rendered difficult by wandering bands of Canadian ex-militiamen and Indians; and the fear of a winter attack from Montreal on the west kept them constantly on the alert. By the end of the winter the garrison's effective fighting strength was only 3000. Accordingly when in April 1760 de Lévis with 10,000 men approached Quebec, Murray found himself in a much more difficult position than Montcalm's in the previous year. To make matters worse, the earth was frostbound and incapable of intrenchment, and the British were forced to meet the French in a pitched battle at St Foy, beyond the Plains of Abraham,

where they were defeated and forced back on Quebec; the French thereupon invested the town, but the arrival on May 9 of the advance-guard of a British squadron compelled de Lévis to fall back on Montreal, followed by Murray with 2200 men. Now Amherst with 10,000 men had ascended the Mohawk to Oswego, whence he descended the St Lawrence, while Colonel Haviland made for Montreal by the Lake Champlain route, being delayed for a time at Isle-aux-Noix, which was finally evacuated. Amherst reached La Chine, nine miles from Montreal, on September 6, where he joined forces with Haviland; Murray made his appearance a day later, and on September 8 Montreal capitulated. By the articles of capitulation the whole of Canada, save some small unfortified fishing stations¹, passed to Great Britain, an arrangement confirmed by the treaty of Paris in 1763. Even Louisiana, the last of all her vast North American possessions, France ceded to Spain by the same treaty.

The perseverance of the British attack had conquered the difficulties Nature placed in the way. The French armies, too, had frequently been larger than the British owing to the feudal nature of land tenure in the French territories and the mobility of the Canadian militia. The secret of the British success was the co-operation of attacking parties along the three lines of attack, and the fact that the ambitions and energies of France were centred in Europe, though America offered a richer field for both. Braddock failed where Forbes succeeded because in the former's time no Bradstreet threatened his enemies' flank, and it was a similar danger which at last cost the French Ticonderoga. In the later years Niagara was captured at the cost of a year's campaigning, when it is probable that, if the Niagara force had gone eastward instead of westward and by this movement threatened Montreal, Isle-aux-Noix would

¹ The French were granted fishing rights off Newfoundland and in the Gulf of St Lawrence, with the Miquelons and St Pierre as stations.

have been evacuated in 1759, and Amherst might have been able to assist Wolfe in an earlier capture of Quebec. Since both Britain and France were dependent upon the sea as a highway along which to send reinforcements, the position of the British settlements was the ultimate factor in their success. Had the French pushed on towards Albany and New York after the fall of Fort William Henry, their success would have been greater only for the moment, for a British capture of Louisbourg, the key to the French populated territories, and a British fleet in the St Lawrence before Quebec, would have caused them to retreat from so advanced a position just as quickly as they actually retreated from Ticonderoga and Crown Point. On the other hand, had the French fleet retained command of the estuary of the St Lawrence and of the ocean near the mouth of the Hudson, the French would never have lost possession of the valley of the Ohio. Louisbourg, then, was the key-stone of the French arch. The danger at Louisbourg prevented the French from attacking Albany, the British position at Albany made Bradstreet's success at Frontenac possible, and this success gave Fort Duquesne to Forbes. The fall of Louisbourg gave Ticonderoga and Crown Point to Amherst, and his advance made possible the capture of Niagara and thus clinched Bradstreet's success, opening up to Amherst the route from Lake Ontario to Montreal. Finally, the character of the British settlements was in their favour. In the early campaigns the assistance of their Indian allies helped the French to victory, but in the later ones the Indians were less important, and the large bodies of colonial troops, though very much smaller than they might have been, provided the British generals with reinforcements in time of need¹. Again, the French were

¹ Wolfe, after the fall of Louisbourg, wrote in very uncomplimentary terms of the colonials when in the face of danger, though for men like Bradstreet he had the warmest admiration.

not agriculturists to the extent that the British were, and Indian support in their fighting meant the suspension of their only source of profit, the fur-trade, and their difficulty in obtaining sufficient provisions was rendered insurmountable by the fall of Louisbourg, since they could thereafter obtain no supplies from France.

The transfer of the French forts west of Montreal was carried out as a rule during the summer of 1760. In September Robert Rogers, who had led a corps of men called Rogers' Rangers throughout the operations in the neighbourhood of Lake Champlain in 1756 and 1757, was sent by Amherst to take possession of the northern forts of Detroit and Michillimackinac. He and his party took from September 12 to October 1 to reach Niagara, and by the twenty-ninth of the month Detroit changed hands. The ice on the lakes, however, prevented the expedition from reaching Michillimackinac, which with the remoter forts remained in French hands during the winter.

In the summers of 1761 and 1762 the Indians planned a general rising to drive away the British. This rising was the fruit of the harsh and unsympathetic attitude which had distinguished the British colonists in their treatment of the Indians, whose resentment was further increased by the fact, already referred to, that British advance meant settlement of territory. The leader of the Indians was Pontiac, who finally besieged Detroit, gallantly defended by Major Gladwyn. Reinforcements sent to Detroit were defeated, Sandusky and other forts were captured by the Indians, the captures in each case being followed by horrible massacres of the defenders, yet the siege of Detroit continued; for the occupants received supplies of food from the Canadians in the vicinity, as Pontiac was at war only with the British and hoped to prevail upon the French Canadians to join him against them. Finally the Indians raised the siege in despair of taking the place. But Fort




Fig. 14. The Wilderness Road and the Cumberland Gap.
 Land over 1500 feet above sea-level, black. The Wilderness Road is indicated by the dots.

Pitt (formerly Fort Duquesne) lay like Detroit in the heart of the Indian country, and the Indians gradually massed themselves against it, and were able to pass beyond it eastward and harass the British frontiers as they had done in the early stages of the Franco-British struggle. The outlying parts of Pennsylvania and Virginia were devastated, and the colonists were butchered as before, the people fleeing before the outrages and assembling in the frontier towns, a starving multitude. Fort Ligonier was in great danger, and in the summer of 1763 a force was sent against the Indians with the ultimate object of relieving the 380 men in Fort Pitt. Bouquet, the leader, passed from Pennsylvania by Forbes's Road, ended the tension at Fort Ligonier, and defeated the Indians at Bushy Run. (Fig. 10, p. 46.) He was sharply attacked, but feigned retreat and so lured the Indians from the woods to their undoing. An expedition from the Lakes under Bradstreet combined with Bouquet's success to take the heart from the Indian attack, and with the assassination of Pontiac in 1769 the troubles on the frontier gradually ceased. The credit of quelling the rising lay, not with the apathetic colonists, but with the British Government which supplied the troops and implemented the promises by which Johnson kept the Iroquois quiet, their hunting-grounds being declared inalienable by a royal proclamation.

Before the war the attention of the Virginians had been vaguely drawn to the region between the Great Kanawha and the Monongahela Rivers, and by the year of Pontiac's death Pittsburg had grown to a manor of nine square miles in area, and the Monongahela country had become populous. At the point where the states of Virginia, North Carolina and Tennessee now come together is the Cumberland Gap. In 1769 Daniel Boone made his first journey through this famous gateway of the west to the Kentucky River, finding a land fertile and fair awaiting the enterprising colonist, the famous Blue Grass Region, where at the present time

the finest racing trotters of the United States are bred. Six years later Boone with a band of companions journeyed from the settlements of the Holston by his former route, blazing on his way the famous Wilderness Road, and carried the American frontier well down the Ohio River; the Wilderness Road gradually developed into a great highway from the east to the west even beyond the Mississippi. About the year 1775 we must picture the gradual progress of the colonists westward as an advance along the eastern side of the plateau in a trough between the Alleghany Mountains and the Blue Ridge, stretching from the Potomac to within fifty miles of the Cumberland Gap. Settlers who passed beyond the Alleghany scarp had the choice of the Wilderness Road and Braddock's and Forbes's Roads to the north. This expansion westward was mainly developed from Virginia, the western boundary of which had never been delimited, as that of Pennsylvania had been.

In Canada Governor Murray, the defender of Quebec in 1760, found the white inhabitants only too ready to enjoy the blessings of peace, and so little disinclination did they show to accept British rule and lead industrious lives that before long he preferred them to the English and American immigrants, whom he described as "the most immoral collection of men I ever knew." The British Government wisely decided to interfere as little as possible with the French inhabitants, in order that there might grow up in them a spontaneous loyalty to their new rulers, and in 1774, with the approval of Sir Guy Carleton, Murray's successor, the Quebec Act was passed by Parliament, guaranteeing the Roman Catholic establishment, confirming the French code of civil law, but replacing the French criminal law by the more humane British system. The result of the American War of Independence and the harsh treatment meted out to loyalists in the United States by the victors in that struggle led to extensive settlements

on the part of these loyalists in what are now the provinces of New Brunswick and Ontario, and in 1791 Parliament, wiser by the loss of the American colonies, tried to satisfy self-governing aspirations in Canada by passing the Constitutional Act, which divided the country into Upper Canada (Ontario) and Lower Canada (Quebec). Each province was granted a representative Assembly, and at the head of the executive was a Governor appointed by the King. The system, however, worked badly. Lower Canada regarded the new Assembly as "une machine Anglaise pour nous taxer," and British ignorance of Canada prevented satisfaction in the other province; but with the country's working out of her own political salvation, and her subsequent expansion, we are not here concerned. Suffice it to say that the English-speaking and French-speaking populations are now united in the bonds of a common loyalty, any acute struggle of races being a thing of the past.


SUMMARY OF CHAPTER VIII

The capture of Quebec meant the loss of Canada to France. The rest of the war was occupied with the rounding-up of the scattered forces. The fall of Montreal was merely the official recognition that France was beaten, and the fact that the final stages of the conflict lasted so long is striking testimony to the difficulties of moving troops overland, and emphasises the truth of the statement that Louisbourg was the keystone in the French arch.

CHAPTER IX

DISCONTENT IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES

THE reader will have gathered from the earlier pages that the colonies which were to be the nucleus of the United States of America had been established in various ways, and before any attempt is made to recount the causes of the discontent, reasonable and spurious, which led up to the War of Independence, it will be well to make a short



CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

Fig. 15. The American Colonies.

I	New Hampshire	II	Massachusetts	III	Rhode Island
IV	Connecticut	V	New York	VI	Pennsylvania
VII	New Jersey	VIII	Delaware	IX	Maryland
X	Virginia	XI	North Carolina	XII	South Carolina
XIII	Georgia.				

survey of the provinces involved. The vague charters which had brought most of them into being had too often left the boundaries ill defined, for some had been founded by companies with unlimited rights of settlement, while others had a definite frontier set to the west. Pennsylvania and Maryland had their western boundaries fixed, while the New England charter of 1620, and those of Connecticut (1662), Carolina (1665) and Georgia (1732) assigned the Pacific as the western limit of occupation, a limit which was naturally as vague in practice as it was magnificent on paper. The thirteen colonies may be conveniently divided into three groups, centring round Virginia, New York and Massachusetts respectively, but it must be borne in mind that the only effective geographical tie uniting them together was a remoteness from Europe; the sentimental tie of union with the mother-country was of varying strength in various colonies, but nowhere strong.

Of the first group Virginia, the original settlement of which was aristocratic in nature, had grown wealthy as a result of the European demand for tobacco, and in its capital of Jamestown saw in 1619 the first American Assembly, the House of Burgesses. The colony was often badly governed, particularly under the later Stewarts, and the Assemblies and the Governors were continually in opposition, but her material prosperity was in the eighteenth century undoubted. The population was scattered, and there were no towns of any size, with the result that a comprehensive view of matters of public interest was difficult of attainment, and the inhabitants of the plantations were a law unto themselves. Maryland, named after Henrietta Maria, Charles I's queen, got her charter in 1632 and was partly settled by colonists from Virginia. Lord Baltimore, by the original charter declared owner of the soil, could only legislate with the consent of a majority of the freemen, and the Crown undertook never to impose taxes of any

sort on the inhabitants. Maryland's prosperity was, like that of Virginia, based upon tobacco, and her population was similarly distributed. The Carolinas, North and South, unlike all the other colonies, were established in an independent fashion unauthorised by their charters, and none had a more lawless youth in spite of settlements of industrious French and German Protestants in 1685 and 1711 respectively. Georgia was carved out of South Carolina, being founded by charter in 1732, among the earliest settlers being Moravians and Scottish Highlanders.

In the second group New York, which had been first settled by the Dutch, was ruled with great harshness by its first English Governors, but in 1683 the authority of the provincial Assembly was recognised. The colony was eminently commercial in its origin, and it remained largely commercial in spirit. The district between the Hudson and the Delaware, New Jersey, became a proprietary government under Berkeley, formerly Governor of Jersey, and rapidly attracted a population on account of the freedom of worship and the right of self-taxation which it enjoyed. Pennsylvania, as the youngest of the colonies founded as a refuge from religious intolerance, may be classed with the more northern provinces. It was obtained by purchase from Charles II by William Penn in 1682, and in the same year Philadelphia (the City of Brotherly Love) was founded, and the growth of the capital was so rapid that in three years it is said to have expanded more than New York did in fifty. Delaware was originally part of the Quaker colony, and requires no separate description.

The New England colonies form the third group, the first settlers being the Pilgrim Fathers. These industrious men soon after their landing were able to produce more corn than they required, and they traded the surplus to the Indians for the only articles of value which the latter could command, viz. furs. The Indians, from being a

semi-agricultural community, were thus induced to revert to the position of hunters, and this retrogressive step was the first toward their extinction. In 1622 a settlement took place on the territory afterwards known as New Hampshire as a result of a grant of land from the Plymouth Company, and another grant by the same body led to a landing on Massachusetts Bay in 1628, and the foundation of the town of Salem. The growth of this colony of Massachusetts was very rapid, three thousand immigrants strengthening its population in 1635 alone: Boston soon became its most important town. The expulsion from Massachusetts of a young preacher named Roger Williams for preaching freedom of conscience led to the establishment of what became the colony of Rhode Island on territory granted to him by friendly Indians. Connecticut, on the other hand, was part of a grant of land made to various men, including Lord Say and Sele, in 1631, and its first inhabitants came from Massachusetts in 1634 and 1635, while dissatisfaction with the form of government in the latter state led to another large influx in 1636. Connecticut grew rapidly, and in 1662 the numerous settlements were united by a liberal charter granted by Charles II.

Now the mother-country believed that the colonies owed both their existence and their prosperity to her, and that their activities must be directed into the one channel of contributing to her own wealth. They were allowed freedom of trade previous to 1650, and American tobacco warehouses were established on the Continent of Europe, but England's cupidity was aroused and their foreign trade received a severe blow by an act of 1650 which forbade the colonies to export or import goods in other than English or colonial vessels. Additional restrictions were imposed by the Navigation Act of 1660, which provided that the chief colonial products should be brought first to England, and thence re-exported in English ships to




Fig. 10. A Map of North America made before the War of Independence.

the colonies which required them. Further than that, an act of 1663 prohibited the importation into the colonies of any goods which had not been loaded at an English port in an English ship; this meant that the colonists were compelled to buy whatever they could not themselves produce from English merchants, often at second hand. The baneful effects of this restriction might have been less heavily felt if the colonists had been permitted to start manufactures on their own account, but the shortsighted selfishness of English manufacturers and exporters procured their prohibition, one of the most ridiculous regulations being that which prevented the colonists from making their own hats from native beaver-skins and selling them to their fellow-colonists. In spite of these irritating burdens, the colonies were rich: great fortunes were unknown, but extreme poverty was also absent. In 1760 the thirteen colonies imported over two and a half million pounds' worth of goods, these including one-sixth of Great Britain's manufactured woollens: the value of their exports was returned at a very much lower figure, just over three-quarters of a million, but beyond a doubt a great deal which found no place in the official returns was exported to foreign countries and their colonial dependencies in defiance of the Navigation Acts, which were systematically evaded. It was estimated that a yearly profit of two millions sterling accrued to our American subjects from their trade. Profit per head must be largely a matter of guess-work, but if we reckon their whole export and import trade at three and a half millions, and the population at one and a half millions, we see that the colonists had a trade which, for the time, compares favourably with the modern range of foreign and colonial trade, viz. from £2 to £20 per head.

The colonists had by the beginning of George I's reign enjoyed for many years privileges of representative government and of self-taxation, which the people of Great Britain

had scarcely yet dreamed of, while their educational system was highly creditable to them and generally cheap. The temper of the people was therefore little likely to be understood by politicians unacquainted with such novel conditions, and the absence of any settled policy on the part of the British Government made matters worse. Great Britain had no special Colonial Secretary till 1768, and the ignorance which prevailed in England of all things American is well illustrated by the British Admiralty's sending to a warship on Lake Ontario a complete equipment of casks for storing fresh water. This ignorance was aggravated by the difficulty of communication with the colonies. It was before the age of steamships or submarine cables, messages brought back a reply after an interval of three months, dissatisfaction was difficult to gauge and remedies were tardy of application. Much of the dissatisfaction was unreasonable, no doubt, as when protests were entered by the colonists against the securing to the Iroquois of their lands, a policy which marked a justice that the Americans were sometimes slow to extend to others while they claimed it themselves; but that real grievances existed no one can deny. The inhabitants of our Dominions across the seas to-day are bound to the mother-country by the bond of a common loyalty to the head of the State in whose name all administrative and executive functions are carried on, and the Americans acknowledged the same tie, but they were not ready to accord the same superiority to a Parliament in which they were unrepresented, which altered their laws and annulled their charters and suspended their assemblies as it saw fit.


The Peace of Paris (1763) left Britain with a debt of 140 millions, much of which had been incurred in the defence of America, and France was only waiting for an opportunity to regain her lost possessions there. The colonies obviously would have to be defended by Great Britain, for they had been proved incapable of protecting themselves unaided.

Grenville, a Whig minister, proposed that the colonies should bear a part of the cost: so in 1763 new customs duties were imposed and the Navigation Acts were more strictly enforced. Two years later the first Quartering Act, afterwards repeated yearly, required the colonies to provide barracks and stores for the British forces. There was some precedent for this, Loudon having insisted in 1756 on the provision of free quarters for his officers. But British officers had never been popular with the colonists, for which they often had themselves to blame, and the Puritan and Quaker colonies looked on a standing army as a sinful institution: Massachusetts accordingly refused to supply the required stores, and the Assembly of New York passed an act to the same effect. The British Government thereupon suspended the Assembly till such time as the stores should be forthcoming, a step which aroused the strongest resentment. The other act by which Grenville in 1763 hoped to raise revenue was the Stamp Act, which ordained that legal documents and newspapers should bear stamps of varying value, from a halfpenny to ten pounds, according to a prescribed scale: at the same time the Navigation Acts were relaxed, to show the colonists that the motives of the British Government were not selfish. But the colonists would have no taxation without representation, which, had it been demanded and granted, might have paved the way for the rise of a great federal Empire, and they protested vigorously against the act, forming associations pledged to buy only their own manufactures. Their protests were supported by Pitt, who came into office on Grenville's fall, the British trading classes urged the pacification of their American customers, and the act was repealed in 1766. But on Pitt's withdrawal from an active part in politics Townshend introduced a bill which became law (1767) to provide for the payment of American Governors and judges by means of customs duties on tea, glass, lead,



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A View of St. John's, upon the River St. John, in CANADA, with the Fortifications, taken from the River 1870, during the late War in America. Engraved by W. H. W. from a drawing by W. H. W.

Fig. 17. A Specimen of the Coast Defences.

paper and painters' colours. The lesson of the Stamp Act had been lost on the British Parliament, and again the colonists manifested the most extreme disapproval, Boston taking the lead. To Boston troops were sent in 1768, and the inhabitants treated the soldiers so outrageously that in 1770 recourse was had to firing on the mob, when three men were killed; whereupon the people of the town assumed the rôle of persecuted martyrs. In the same year the Revenue Act was repealed, save that the duty on tea was retained, but before the excitement had time to subside a vessel engaged in preventive work, the *Gaspée*, was burnt in 1772 by Rhode Island smugglers. In the next year the East India Company sent some cargoes of tea to American ports. New York refused to permit the tea to be landed, Charleston allowed its removal ashore but consigned it to damp cellars where it rotted, and Boston flung it into the harbour. Lord North closed the port of Boston, and altogether four coercive acts were passed against Massachusetts. Colonial anger was vastly increased by a provision of the Quebec Act of 1774 which gave to Canada, most unreasonably, the whole of the Ohio valley which was the natural hinterland of Virginia and Pennsylvania, the New England colonies being further incensed by the establishment of the Roman Catholic religion in Canada. In this year all the colonies except Georgia sent representatives to the First Continental Congress to protest against the treatment meted out to Massachusetts, with the result that the Boston Port Act was extended to nine of the colonies. The Congress met again in 1775 and petitioned George III to restore the conditions which had prevailed in 1763. Their request was rejected, and in April 1776 the Congress proclaimed complete freedom of trade for the colonists, and on July 4 the Declaration of Independence was issued, New York alone having no share in its publication.

SUMMARY OF CHAPTER IX

The colonies had grown up as the result of England's economic need of an outlet for her surplus population after the social upheaval under the Tudors, and by reason of the zeal for religious freedom which animated the Protestants, not only of England, but of western Europe. The white inhabitants of America enjoyed a degree of political and religious freedom unknown elsewhere, but discontent arose for the following reasons:

- (1) commercial and industrial restrictions imposed by a short-sighted and selfish mother-country;
- (2) British ignorance of American conditions, and the difficulty of remedying grievances even when they were known and admitted;
- (3) the passing of sundry acts (Quartering Act, Stamp Act, etc.) by a Parliament in which the colonists were unrepresented;
- (4) Parliamentary interference with what were regarded in America as inalienable political privileges;
- (5) the geographically unwise provisions of the Quebec Act of 1774.

CHAPTER X

THE AMERICAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE, TO THE
SURRENDER AT SARATOGA

HOSTILITIES had been in progress for a year before the Declaration, for the colonists, as we have seen, were in the mood to resort to force before their leaders finally despaired of a peaceful settlement. On April 19, 1775, Gage despatched a force of 1800 men from Boston to destroy a supply of arms and ammunition reported to be stored at Concord, twenty miles distant. At Lexington, four miles from Concord, a skirmish with an armed force took

place which was resumed at Concord itself, the whole country between that place and Boston having been warned of the military movement by a Boston mechanic called Paul Revere. The stores were successfully destroyed, but on their return march the British troops were badly harassed by bands of armed men whose numbers increased with extraordinary rapidity. A few days later the first aggressive act of the colonials was committed when Ticonderoga was seized, Crown Point falling immediately afterwards.

Meanwhile Sir William Howe with reinforcements had been sent to strengthen the British position at Boston, and he arrived in May 1775. Now Boston and Charlestown are situated on peninsulas which are connected with the mainland by what were in 1775 narrow isthmuses, since then widened very considerably by reclamation from the sea on each side. Gage had made sure of Boston Neck, but it was essential that Bunker Hill, an eminence on the Charlestown peninsula which commanded the town, should be held. A large body of American troops on the mainland learned in June that the British had decided to occupy the hill; they promptly despatched a force by night across Charlestown Neck and seized the coveted position, throwing up a small earthwork. It seemed a most rash step thus to bring on an engagement with the Boston garrison, for the American militia were badly organised, and so long as they contrived to shut up their enemies in Boston by holding the roads leading from it, they were doing all that could reasonably be asked of them. The next day (June 17) Howe with 2200 men crossed to Charlestown to drive off the colonists and occupy the hill: twice the troops, heavily accoutred and hampered by having to march through standing crops, tried to drive the Americans from their position, and it was only lack of powder which compelled the colonists to give way before a third assault. But the British troops lost in killed and wounded nearly five men

for every two lost by their opponents, and Howe was disagreeably surprised by the orderly retreat which his foes effected to their main body, whose presence had prevented him from trying to cut off the force on Bunker Hill by getting behind it and thus laying himself open to a flank attack by the main colonial body. He might easily have done so, however, had Gage backed him up with the naval force at his disposal, quite sufficient to keep back the main army



Fig. 18. Boston and Neighbourhood.

of colonials, and Gage's failure to employ his naval artillery for this purpose was a fatal mistake. Under the protection of the fleet Howe could hardly have failed to capture or annihilate the American force on Bunker Hill.

In the autumn two expeditions moved against Canada, one under Montgomery down the Richelieu towards Montreal, the other striking across for Quebec from the Kennebec River. The invaders' hope that the French Canadians would join them was disappointed, for the latter knew

too well what chances they had of retaining their religion and laws if ruled by the people of New England. Sir Guy Carleton abandoned Montreal and made for Quebec, which he defended so ably that Montgomery was killed: the other leader, Benedict Arnold, besieged Quebec throughout the winter, but the arrival of a British fleet in the spring compelled him to beat a retreat, and Carleton defeated him in the summer of 1776 on Lake Champlain, destroying his fleet. And so we come to the main operations of the war.

The advantages which America possessed in the struggle were great. Her territory was too vast for effective military occupation; resistance to the British troops was universal though not united; Britain's only base of operations was the coast, and that only so long as she retained command of the sea; the deeply indented coastline made the movement by land of large bodies of troops a lengthy proceeding, and the British had most of the journeying to do; the colonials, though badly equipped, were more mobile than the over-equipped royal troops; Wolfe and Clive had left no thoroughly competent successors, while Washington united to his military skill a patience and forbearance in his dealings with troops, commanders and politicians, which reveal the true greatness of the man.

The winter of 1775-76 spelt much hardship to Howe's troops in Boston, for the colonial army cut them off from the mainland, while American whalers had control of the sea. Howe was the more easily kept a prisoner in Boston by the nature of the town's environment. The hills lie not far from the coast, and the intervening lowland had a relatively dense population, which was therefore in a position to furnish men and supplies without great difficulty. Washington was meanwhile instilling some measure of discipline and order into his untrained levies, and in March 1776 he began a bombardment of the town from the heights

to the south-west which finally compelled Howe to evacuate it, the British fleet co-operating with him to carry the troops safely to Halifax. In the same year the loyalists of North Carolina attempted to capture the capital, Wilmington, but were defeated, and in South Carolina General Clinton was no more successful in his attempt to obtain control of Charleston harbour, in which if he had succeeded, the commerce of the south would have suffered a severe blow. The swampy nature of the environs of Charleston prevented an attack by land, but Clinton attempted with eight ships to take Sullivan's Island commanding the harbour. His attempt failed, and the squadron withdrew with the loss of one ship. The result reflected great credit on the defenders of Charleston, and emboldened the south in proportion as it disheartened the British. (Fig. 15, p. 72.)

After Howe had got his forces safely from Boston to Halifax, he prepared to move on New York with the object of securing control of the Hudson and co-operating with Burgoyne, who was to advance down that river from Canada. Washington stationed his 15,000 men on a line of heights running across Long Island in front of the city, but Howe contrived to dislodge him on August 27. The American troops had had no experience of pitched battles, but at Bunker Hill had shown a marked ability to maintain a dogged resistance behind intrenchments, and their leader probably made a mistake in bringing them out into the open at Long Island. Again, Nathaniel Greene had contracted fever in the Long Island swamps, and his absence from the fighting line was a serious loss to the Americans, for his knowledge of the ground and the capacity which he afterwards displayed in similar situations would have been of inestimable value. When everything has been said, however, the British victory was fully deserved by reason of the skill with which the whole operation had been

planned and carried into execution. After the engagement Washington took his troops under cover of fog without loss across the East River, which separates Long Island from New York, and, in the opinion of a recent military historian of the United States, "a more skilful military operation of this kind was never conducted." But the presence of the British force on the island and a British fleet in the river—in spite of obstructions which the Americans had expected would bar its way—rendered the retention of New York impossible, and on September 15 Washington evacuated it and took up a position on Haarlem Heights to the west, whence he was driven after heavy fighting, the capture of two American forts a few miles up the Hudson on opposite banks of the river further weakening his position. Accordingly the American commander crossed the Hudson into New Jersey. Now it would have been to the ultimate advantage of the British had Howe strengthened his position in the Hudson valley by stationing a garrison at Albany to make Burgoyne's advance from the north easier, but he did not receive exact information of the plan of campaign till it was too late. Lord Cornwallis pursued Washington into New Jersey, but the latter skilfully avoided an engagement, and finally Howe moved all his troops across the Hudson and went into winter quarters, distributing his men here and there in small detachments.

A great many of Howe's regular troops were German mercenaries, hired by the British Parliament from the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, the Duke of Brunswick and others. Close upon 30,000 such troops altogether were sent to America, of whom about 7500 died in action or from disease, 5000 deserted, and rather more than 17,000 returned to Europe. In addition to the yearly payments which Great Britain made to their various rulers for the loan of them; she agreed to pay £7 for each man killed, and the sum shows at how low a rate the life of a human

being was esteemed by those German princes. The general name applied to these mercenaries was *Hessians* from the fact that 60 per cent. of them came from Hesse-Cassel. On Howe's orders a body of these Hessians, ignorant of the language and unpopular with the colonists, occupied Trenton. Washington decided that they should be attacked. American troops were moved across the Delaware, and the Marblehead fishermen who were responsible for the transportation found their task no light one by reason of the floating ice on the river. That task accomplished, the troops began a march of the most trying kind to Trenton: their clothes were in rags, their boots in many cases had long been discarded, the night was dark, stormy and bitterly cold, and absolute silence was essential. Two men were actually frozen to death. But the heroism of the Americans had its reward, for their night-attack surprised the occupants of Trenton, and many prisoners and guns were taken.

In August 1777 Howe sailed up Chesapeake Bay, and, landing his men at the mouth of the Elk River, began an advance on Philadelphia, fifty miles distant. The Brandywine River, a tributary of the Delaware, flowed between the British and the town, and between Brandywine and Philadelphia Washington lay with about 8000 fit and 6000 unfit men. Lord Cornwallis attacked the Americans on the flank after crossing the river higher up, and the general engagement which followed ended in the rout of the enemy, who lost 1300 killed, wounded or captured. The Marquis de la Fayette, whose military knowledge was to prove of such value to the Americans, sustained a slight wound in the encounter. So much discouraged were the American troops by this reverse, and so many desertions of officers and men followed it, that Washington made up his mind to raise their spirits again if possible by an attack upon Howe, now fourteen miles off at Germantown. He depended

upon a fog to get his men into position, but the fog ultimately proved a curse. In spite of the fact that Greene on the left wing was late in reaching his appointed position and in bringing his troops into action, the Americans were pushing home an effective attack, when panic suddenly seized them. The fog blinded them to the true state of affairs and they frequently mistook their own men for bodies of British, and so a partial and unauthorised retreat was converted into a complete and organised one by Washington's orders after three and a half hours' fighting. But the officers on the other side admitted that their opponents' plans had been well laid and the retreat conducted in excellent order. Not long afterwards Howe moved his army from Germantown to Philadelphia. (Fig. 10, p. 46.)

Earlier in the summer Burgoyne had started out from Montreal to join forces with Howe at New York. The distance between these two towns is almost exactly the same as between London and Edinburgh, and the highest point on the route is only 147 feet above sea-level; but the ground was, and is still, densely wooded. Burgoyne's force numbered over 8000 regular troops besides Canadians and Indians, and he had with him a large train of artillery, a serious handicap in such a country. He occupied Ticonderoga without striking a single blow, and later took Fort Edward on the Hudson and Fort Schuyler on the Mohawk. But a detachment which he sent to take Bennington in New Hampshire, where American stores were deposited, was defeated on August 16 with great loss, as were the reinforcements sent to its support. In spite of this defeat Burgoyne, sadly hampered by the artillery and stores with which he was provided to excess, pushed on slowly, crossed the Hudson, and occupied Saratoga on September 14. Five days later, and again on October 7, Burgoyne engaged the Americans beyond that place, but each time suffered most disastrous losses. In the whole campaign his total

losses amounted to no fewer than 2495 men, killed, wounded or taken prisoners. He fell back on Saratoga, and was



Fig 19. Part of a map made by one of General Burgoyne's officers.

preparing to retire to Fort Edward when news arrived that the fort was in American hands. Without food for

his men or forage for his horses, Burgoyne surrendered October 16, 1777. Clinton, who had been left in command at New York when Howe left for Philadelphia, had proceeded up the Hudson and, supported by a fleet, had gained control of the river's navigation by the capture of two forts on the right bank, but he was too late to help Burgoyne, and the attempt to isolate New England from the rest of the colonies failed. By the agreement entered into with the victors, Burgoyne's troops were to lay down their arms "by word of command of their own officers," proceed to Boston, and thence sail for England, and they were not to be employed on any subsequent occasion in America during the continuance of the war. As a matter of fact they never left America, for their arrival in England would have set free a corresponding number of troops from garrison duty there, who might then have crossed the Atlantic. Most of the captured force were exchanged from time to time, and many of them, particularly the Hessians, were permitted to escape and settle in America.

It has been already remarked that Burgoyne's chances of success would have been greatly improved if Howe had placed a garrison in Albany; and the truth of the statement should be evident when one considers that not only were the American troops unhampered by any attack from the south, but that the British failure to appreciate the strategic value of the Hudson valley, and establish on the river a regular patrol of boats, enabled the colonists to make a flank attack upon Burgoyne from New England. Albany would undoubtedly have been occupied had Howe been acquainted with Burgoyne's plans, but the fact that possession of the Hudson valley would have meant the sundering of the colonial forces ought to have been a sufficient reason for an attempt at such possession long before it was achieved by Clinton. Again, the ease with which attacks could be delivered from the flank proves that



View of the West Bank of the Hudson River 3. Miles above Still Water, upon which the Army made the remainder of ^{the} General Burgoyne's last post on the 22nd of 1777

(Showing General Fraser's Position)

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Fig. 20. A British Camp on the Hudson River.

Burgoyne's line of communication could be readily cut, the capture of Fort Edward being a case in point. Finally, the experience of the Seven Years' War ought to have demonstrated to the British that any deviation from the

Then the Saw Mill & Block House upon Fort Anne (such the property of Genl. Mifflin).



*When Genl. Burgoyne's Army advancing was set fire to by the Americans
(Published in the 1st volume (p. 170) by W. Lewis, Engraver, London)*

Fig. 21. An American Saw-mill and Block-house.

water-communications, so vital for the transportation of stores, was a cardinal error; the French had always made a point of keeping their waterways open, but along the very route where such a policy was of the most urgent importance the British failed to do so.

SUMMARY OF CHAPTER X

The British had before them an almost impossible task, and the Americans' triumph was only postponed for reasons discreditable to themselves (such as selfishness, jealousy and the like), or unavoidable under the circumstances (such as lack of discipline, equipment and military experience). The British failures were mainly due to the muddling methods of the British Government, and Howe's neglect to secure the Hudson route early enough. For guerilla warfare the Americans showed an aptitude which occasions no surprise, but more cordial co-operation between their leaders, and between leaders and politicians, might have won for them success even in pitched battles. The surrender at Saratoga, the greatest British disaster of the earlier part of the war, was caused by (1) the absence of an attack from New York, (2) the failure to prevent a flank attack from New England, and (3) the ease with which the British line of communication could be broken. On the whole, the Americans took greater advantage of their knowledge of the ground, whether local or regional, than did their opponents: naturally enough, the information at the disposal of the colonial leaders was more detailed, but, when every allowance is made for their advantage in that respect, one cannot help admitting that the British generals lamentably failed to turn to account the topographical knowledge which they possessed in common with their adversaries.

CHAPTER XI

THE AMERICAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE, TO
THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

THE winter of 1777-78 saw Philadelphia, New York and Rhode Island in the hands of the British, who had to depend upon their command of the sea to retain their grip on these widely distant positions. But in 1778 France declared war, and in April a French fleet of seventeen vessels, mounting 834 guns, left Toulon and sailed to endanger British naval supremacy. Philadelphia was evacuated, and

the British army was massed in New York. The British fleet lay off Newport and it was only a storm which saved it from Admiral d'Estaing, who had to proceed to Boston for repairs, afterwards sailing to the West Indies to attack the British possessions there. The departure of the French fleet left Clinton free to organise an expedition against Georgia, where the most furious fighting was going on between loyalists and republicans. Savannah fell, the swampy nature of its surroundings, though assisting in its defence, contributing to carelessness on the part of its defenders. The Carolinas, under orders from Congress, and supported by 5000 French troops supplied by d'Estaing, raised a force which invested Savannah, but jealousy among the colonials prevented mutual helpfulness, and the siege was a failure.

The year 1778 was notable for the arrival of the man who, more than any other, imparted to the American levies the discipline of regular troops, and gave to them an adequate military organisation. This was Baron Steuben, whose principal experience had been gained in Europe under Frederick in the Seven Years' War: he was sent over by the French, and, joining as a volunteer, was quickly advanced to the position of Inspector-General of the American forces. Under his supervision the appalling waste, which had characterised the American conduct of the war, was checked; he drew up the first drill-book of the new nation, and formulated very necessary regulations for troops on active service; and lastly, he drilled the troops in person until they were able to carry out with a fair degree of precision such evolutions as were likely to be required of them. In short, his employers could hardly have found a more helpful servant and efficient instructor.

The summer of 1779 was occupied in minor operations in the middle and northern states, the heat of the season bringing to a close for some time all hostilities in Georgia

and South Carolina. Clinton gained possession of several forts on the Hudson, Connecticut was raided by the British from their base of New York, and a naval expedition inflicted on Virginia a loss estimated at over half a million sterling. In October of the same year the British troops were withdrawn from Rhode Island to strengthen Clinton's force in New York. Meanwhile the western districts endured grave hardships by reason of Indian attacks: the colonists had first introduced native allies into the struggle, but the Indians had little love for the settlers who dispossessed them, and some regard for the British Government which allowed them to retain their territories, with the natural result that the British got more assistance from them than did the Americans. Now the settlers in Kentucky, who have been already referred to, had suffered serious molestation at the hands of the Indians in 1776 and 1777, so in June 1778 John Rogers Clark made a successful attempt to acquire for the Americans the Illinois region as a means of preventing further danger to the western settlements. He surprised Kaskaskia, occupied by a French-Canadian garrison, and secured the co-operation of the populace of the territory, being also very successful in keeping the Indian tribes at peace. Accordingly, when the British commander at Detroit took the fort of Vincennes, the assistance, active and passive, of the population enabled Clark to compel its surrender in February 1779, the Ohio valley thus becoming American territory. In the same year an expedition was despatched against the Iroquois, and their cultivated lands between the Susquehanna and the Genesee Rivers were left desolate, and their stores of corn, in one case alone amounting to 160,000 bushels, destroyed, the Indians themselves fleeing as far as Niagara before they escaped from General Sullivan's men.

The southern campaign began in 1780, and the distance between the northern and southern colonies made it quite

distinct from that in the north. It took a courier, riding express, twenty days to reach Savannah from Boston, while an army took thrice that time to march the distance: even by sea the voyage of 1100 miles occupied from eight to thirty days. It is evident then that operations in the south had to be conducted without reference to movements in the north, whence no support was available, and it is likewise clear that command of the sea was of first-rate importance. On February 26, 1780, Clinton with 8500 troops came in sight of Charleston (South Carolina). The town is connected with the mainland by a narrow neck, whose swampy nature renders it impossible for an attacking force to approach by land if resistance is offered, but at the same time makes it impossible to dislodge such a force once it has been allowed to obtain a footing; the River Cooper on the north and the Ashley on the south still further strengthen the city's defences; while the mouth of the harbour is narrow and therefore easily defended. In the operations which took place, however, the Americans showed little ability to profit by their situation, for the mouth of the harbour was early deserted, and Clinton, using the harbour as a base, was able to construct siege-works on the neck, while repelling any attempts to relieve the garrison from the mainland. The town, thus isolated, and filled by a disaffected population, was surrendered on May 12, 1780¹.

The capture of Charleston with its important harbour was the means of making the Carolinas the seat of war during the rest of the campaign, Clinton leaving Lord Cornwallis in command and returning to New York in June, where treasonable communications from the American Benedict Arnold, who offered to surrender West Point

¹ The American force which capitulated numbered 5466 men, and 391 guns, 5316 muskets and enormous stores of ammunition were taken. The British lost only 250 killed and wounded.

on the Hudson, reached him. The meditated treachery, however, was discovered by the Americans in time to prevent the loss of a post which was indispensable to them if their communications between the states north and south of the Hudson were to be kept open. With regard to Cornwallis's operations in the south, the reader must bear in mind that the country was divided up numerous streams, each the middle of a swampy strip, which ran more or less at right angles to the coast; the land between these rivers was thickly wooded, and was traversed by few roads, highways capable of carrying heavy traffic being to this day far from numerous. Under the circumstances large bodies of troops were not employed, but local knowledge and rapid movement were determining factors in the campaign. The first engagement was fought near the town of Camden, where Cornwallis had fixed his headquarters. Though his communications with the coast were in danger through the activity of the guerilla leader Colonel Sumpter—who ten days previously had taken a British post at Hanging Rock with a force which included a boy of thirteen, Andrew Jackson by name, who was later to become President of the United States—Cornwallis left Camden on August 16 with an army of 2000 to meet General Gates with thrice that number. The site of the battle was bounded on either side by a marsh, and the engagement was preceded by a disgraceful flight on the part of the Virginia militia and most of the North Carolina militia, so that the opposing forces were left nearly equal. Washington's troops from Maryland and Delaware held their ground for a time, but were finally defeated, eight cannon and much baggage becoming British booty. Colonel Tarleton with 160 men was then despatched against Sumpter and defeated him with great slaughter, the British leader's success being largely due to the rapidity of his march.

In September Cornwallis set out for North Carolina,

having sent Major Patrick Ferguson to raise a force of American loyalists in the western uplands. Ferguson's mission was successful inasmuch as he added to a company of 125 regulars a body of 1000 loyalists, but this recruiting stirred up the Independents to fresh activity, and a force of 1250 men gathered together to attack him; his position was on a hill near King's Mountain, but the opposing army demonstrated that a good shot may be as deadly from a lower as from any other position, and after an hour's fight on October 7, Ferguson himself having been shot, the Americans took the post, 548 men having been killed or wounded in the effort to retain it. The news of this disaster induced Cornwallis to retrace his steps, while Sumpter was busy intercepting convoys of provisions and stores, later defeating Tarleton at Blackstock in November. It had been the British general's intention to effect a junction in North Carolina with a force of 1500 men under General Leslie, who was to have marched from New York to his assistance, but the set-back which the British had experienced made it necessary for Leslie to proceed to Charleston by sea, and before he could join Cornwallis a serious defeat was sustained by Tarleton at the Cowpens on January 17, 1781.

In the previous October Gates had been superseded by Greene in the command of the American forces south of the Delaware. The latter was a strategist of no mean order, considerate towards his men, and of a courage unquestioned; he detached a body of about 600 men under General Morgan from his army and sent them to harass Cornwallis's lines of communication in the north-west of South Carolina. The British force under Tarleton was rather greater than the American, which was outflanked, when the main body of the former, mistaking a tactical movement among their opponents for retreat, advanced too far and was surrounded on three sides. Tarleton's

men were utterly defeated, the majority being captured, a serious blow to Cornwallis since they were light troops such as were particularly valuable in that area. Morgan's success was far from rendering his position secure, and, taking advantage of Cornwallis's inaction while the latter awaited Leslie, he retreated on his main body, his knowledge of the country, and a heavy rain which flooded the rivers after he had crossed them, aiding him greatly. The chain of cause and effect between Ferguson's defeat and Morgan's escape is complete and repays examination.

In spite of these reverses Cornwallis determined to assume the offensive and march through North Carolina and Virginia to unite with the British northern army on the Chesapeake, one section of which to the number of 3600 under Benedict Arnold, then in the British service, had arrived on the James River and destroyed Richmond. Greene meanwhile was retreating towards the River Dan, between North Carolina and Virginia, pursued by Cornwallis, who kept to the westward where the streams were more easily forded. It was the month of February 1781; Greene's men were insufficiently clothed, many of them lacked boots, and neither tents nor even blankets were available; rain and snow beat upon the unfortunate toilers over roads alternately frost-bound and deep in mud; surely it was one of the finest feats recorded in military history. So close was the pursuit that Greene crossed the Dan the very night before Cornwallis reached it; the American general had had the advantage of a training in transport work under Washington, and, after collecting sufficient boats on the Yadkin, to the south of the Dan, to ferry his men across, he was protected from that point by a skilful American cavalry leader, Colonel Lee. When Greene had collected reinforcements in Virginia, he made his way back into North Carolina, where Cornwallis had established himself at Hillsborough with a total force of about 2000

men. Greene's army still further increased as it marched south, and by the time the two armies met near Guildford Court House he had twice that number. His men were stationed on rising ground with a ravine in their rear, behind which was the steep hillside. The North Carolina militia fled after firing one ragged volley, while the American right and the British left developed an isolated fight on their own account in the woods. The main attacking force gradually drove the Americans across the ravine, and the British made two ineffective attempts to follow them; they pressed forward in such a formation that their line made an acute angle with that of the ravine, so that the leaders were exposed to a flank attack as they reached the other side. Although his own men suffered by it, Cornwallis ordered his artillery to fire on the Americans, and, the British left wing then making its reappearance, Greene had to retreat. But the victory was as dearly bought by the victors as that at Flodden, for so severe were the British losses that the success could not be followed up. Cornwallis indeed had to retreat towards the coast, pursued by Greene, and he reached Wilmington on April 7, 1781, North Carolina having been lost.

La Fayette with an inferior force had in the meantime held Arnold in check in Virginia, and at the end of April Cornwallis set out from Wilmington to join forces with the latter, while Greene, despite a couple of reverses, was making himself master of South Carolina, which was untenable by British troops directly the lines of communication between their inland posts and their base at Charleston were cut. Cornwallis, meeting with no opposition, reached Petersburg on May 20, whence he proceeded against La Fayette, who, however, eluded him with great skill. The French general was joined by Washington, whose troops, with a body of 1500 newly-arrived French soldiers, were transported across Chesapeake Bay by the French fleet,

which had rendered the most opportune and signal aid to the Americans by its defeat of the British fleet, which then retired to New York for repairs. In the first week of August 1781, Cornwallis took up a position in Yorktown, situated on the peninsula between the estuaries of the York and James Rivers. The place was admirably suited to a force which could obtain supplies by sea, but the presence of the victorious French fleet under de Grasse made it impossible for Cornwallis to do anything but assume the defensive and construct trenches. Twice in September he received promises of assistance from Clinton. On October 11 two of his redoubts were carried by the investing army, and he formed a desperate plan of a night escape by boats from the beleaguered town, but a storm arose which prevented all but a few of his men from crossing to Gloucester. Finally, with damaged defences, and forces weakened by sickness and starvation, Cornwallis surrendered on October 19. Clinton had sailed to his relief with 7000 men, but turned back on hearing of the capitulation.

The war was now practically at an end. Savannah was evacuated in July 1782, Charleston in December of the same year, and on November 25, 1783, the British troops quitted New York. The preliminary peace between Great Britain, France and Spain had been previously signed in Paris on January 20, 1783, whereby the United States was recognised as independent, and the frontier fixed, the arrangements being ratified on September 3 of that year by the treaty of Versailles. Apart from the difficulties which beset Great Britain by reason of her conflicts in Europe, the magnitude of the task which she had assumed in America may be gauged by the fact that, while the Americans spent about £45,000,000 on the struggle, the mother-country was saddled with an expenditure of £140,000,000. Whenever the command of the sea was lost, her chances of success disappeared; and, though

every allowance is made for the fact that no part of the original thirteen states was situated very far from the deeply indented coastline, the theatre of war was too vast for thorough conquest or effective occupation. The Americans could put militia into the field on the shortest notice, though they had to thank Washington for their ultimate success, imperilled as it was by the selfishness, deception, procrastination and petty jealousy, which lie to the charge of politicians and people alike. The loss of the American colonies was the result of the short-sighted policy which Great Britain adopted towards their people, whom she regarded as inferiors. Other European countries oppressed their colonies more, but they had to deal with subjects whose zeal for liberty was either absent or with ease suppressed. Had French naval co-operation with the Americans been constant, the war would have ended earlier than it did, but the French ambition was rather to secure the British West Indies than to help the revolted colonists. Really effective assistance was postponed, but, when given, it ended the war; a war which gave the colonists, besides independence, a political freedom which helped to produce the Revolution in France, and soon a time led to successive extensions of political privilege in Great Britain itself.

SUMMARY OF CHAPTER XI

The year 1778 saw the British in a strong position in the northern and middle colonies, a position which was to be greatly weakened by the military improvement of their opponents under Steuben, and by the Franco-American alliance. Two years later, with the capture of Charleston, the theatre of war had shifted to the south, and in spite of some early British successes the physical features of the country exercised a potent influence on the tactics of the opposing forces, and the Americans were immensely assisted by the change of conditions, while the advent of Greene put heart into them and provided them with adequate leadership: his inspiring personality, aided by that

measure of luck which he and his men had well earned by their desperate privations, enabled the southern American army to evade the able pursuit of Cornwallis until they had secured the reinforcements which warranted their meeting the British troops. The latter had found the greatest difficulty in keeping open their communications with the coast, and had been forced to move north, but their intended junction with their northern army was prevented by the co-operation of the American generals, a state of affairs which had not always been possible. Lastly, the surrender at Yorktown resulted from the above-mentioned co-operation on land, and from the assistance of the French fleet under de Grasse by sea, and when that fleet rendered the coast an untenable base the British failure to coerce the Americans by military force was a foregone conclusion.

CHAPTER XII

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE NATION

THE story which has been told in the preceding pages covers three periods in the growth of the United States.

The early communities of settlers formed a baby state dependent entirely upon the mother-country for protection and maintenance.

When the French settlers became a source of danger the colonies had grown to boyhood, eager and able to help the parent country. Not infrequently active by fits and starts, sulky at times, yet always instinct with life, the colonies were growing to man's estate as a result of their exertions during the troublous time which preceded the fall of Quebec.

This growth led inevitably to the final rupture between son and parent; like a young man chafing at leading-strings, anxious to lead his own life, breaking away under the stress of new ideas from the conservatism of his parents, the colonies achieved independence; and this independence of control meant recognition of the resources of the country.

From 1785 onwards, the new United States became a golden land of promise not only to immigrants who came in thousands from Europe but to many men and women in the Eastern States who broke free from the conditions which were too reminiscent of the period of British domination. New lands to the west attracted these men, and migrants of all kinds were assured that they had only to work to attain comparative affluence and a social position denied to them in the older lands.

But changes of this magnitude occur slowly, and so for a decade after the war was concluded the United States were chiefly occupied in the process of settling down, and as we wish to gain some idea of the country as it grew in power in contrast with what it was before 1785 it is necessary to dwell in this final chapter upon the condition of the United States somewhere about the year 1795 A.D.

The American with characteristic enterprise settled down to the development of the resources of the country for his own benefit. His country, so far as he knew it at that time, was a land of mixed woodland and farmland and under British rule had been exploited, the forests had been cut, the fish had been captured and the land had been exhausted particularly on the tobacco plantations. Under the new conditions it became necessary to check this exploitation; it was requisite to produce many articles which had formerly been obtained from Britain, and thoughtful people began to urge the careful cultivation of the soil, the extension of sheep-rearing, the establishment of factories. Under the influence of the example which was set by England, then beginning to become a nation of manufacturers, Americans commenced to establish and to use machinery. Power was obtained from the wind, from the rivers and from horses; and, at first, machines were set up in the houses and domestic manufactures were established, but, later, small factories arose. Two illustrations will

give an idea of the spirit which stimulated the American people. The town of Lancaster, in Pennsylvania, was the largest inland town in the United States; it was situated




Fig. 22. The Distribution of the Population in 1791 A.D.

66 miles from a seaport and 10 miles from a navigable river. In 1786, the town contained 700 families and there were 234 people engaged in domestic manufactures-36

shoemakers, 25 weavers, 25 smiths, 11 coopers, 7 turners, 4 dyers, 5 silversmiths, 3 brewers, 2 printers, etc. Within 39 miles of the town there were 17 furnaces and forges for the working of iron, and within 10 miles there were 8 tanneries, 18 grain mills, 16 saw mills and 12 other mills. The description of the district reminds the reader very forcibly of similar districts situated in the north of England at the same period. The port of Philadelphia was the largest and most populous seaport and manufacturing town in the United States about 1790. There were two miles of wharves for the shipping and the export of flour almost trebled itself from 1786 to 1792. Lumber was floated down the rivers to the port and coal was brought from Virginia. In shipbuilding Philadelphia exceeded most ports of the world. Water mills were in use for spinning cotton, flax, hemp and wool, and hand machinery for textiles had been introduced from Europe. So great was the port that channels were regularly kept open, throughout the winter, in the ice which usually covered the water for a period of from three to nine weeks.

We may obtain from the consideration of a few facts some idea of the changes which occurred as a result of the establishment of the United States. Before the war there was no direct intercourse between the American States and France, Russia, India or China. In 1790, three million pounds of tea were imported and nine-tenths of this tea came direct from India. About this time (1787-1793) cotton was first imported directly from Bombay and Mauritius; and silk was imported from China and some of it re-exported to Europe. Before the war, Virginia and Maryland exported just over a million bushels of wheat annually. About 1790, Pennsylvania alone exported this quantity and Virginia, Maryland and New York each exported greater quantities. The United States were already regarded in Europe as a source of supplies of wheat

to be relied upon whenever the European harvest was unsatisfactory. After the war the export of beef and pork advanced by leaps and bounds; it soon trebled itself and in 1792 was five times its former figure.

In comparison, between the periods about the years 1770 and 1790, the total exports of bread, flour and wheat had almost doubled, that of maize had trebled; the tonnage of ships engaged in overseas and other trade had almost doubled and the tonnage of ships built had increased by 50 per cent.

School-books in English, German and French were in use, being printed in the United States in 1790, whereas before the war they had to be imported from Europe.

The density of population in 1791 is shown in the accompanying map which indicates that the bulk of the people still lay between the Appalachians and the sea, although the movement westward was steadily growing in intensity. The areas of comparatively dense population were also the areas which had experienced the greatest increase of population since the war, as may be seen from the table (p. 111). The population of Virginia and North Carolina had doubled, that of New York, New Hampshire and Delaware had increased by more than two-thirds, while New Jersey and Connecticut alone had not increased by 25 per cent. in eight years. The Southern States which had had the greatest increase and which formed the largest area of dense population were also notable for the large proportion of slaves (in Virginia one in three).

The produce of these people satisfied their own requirements and also supplied the steadily growing stream of exports, which are summarised in the table on p. 111.

Wheat and tobacco were the chief products and the chief exports, wheat in the north and tobacco in North Carolina and Virginia. Further north, in Massachusetts, fish, beef and pork were largely produced and lumber was sent abroad in large quantities.

Indigo and rice were the products of South Carolina, soon to be eclipsed by the cultivation and export of cotton which arose in the years which immediately succeeded this period. The total exports of the United States about the year 1790 were valued at approximately £4,000,000; *i.e.* about £1 per annum per head of the population. Of these exports only about one-third went to British lands, the United Kingdom, Canada and the British West Indies. About one-quarter went to France and the French West Indies, and about one-tenth each to Spain and Holland. Pennsylvania was responsible for about one-fifth of the exports, and Massachusetts, Maryland and Virginia supplied about one-sixth each¹.

This export trade of the United States required the use of many ships and a striking feature of American progress immediately after the war was the great increase in building and owning ships. In colonial times shipping was restricted by the mother-country but, in 1790, 60 per cent. of the shipping which carried the goods of the United States overseas trade was American. The table, p. 112, shows that the greatest shipping state was Massachusetts and this might be expected when we remember the importance of the fisheries off Newfoundland, the forests of the Northern Mountains and the meat trade of the state. Pennsylvania and New York were almost equal in this respect although Pennsylvania had more American ships and New York had the largest number of foreign ships.

These facts throw light upon the growth of the three great seaports Philadelphia, New York and Boston; and suggest the future line of progress along which New York became responsible for the greater portion of the trade of the United States.

¹ The total export of the United States was about equal in value to that of Harwich at the present time; and the total export per head of the population of the United States is now about £3½.

Philadelphia with a denser population in the neighbourhood, with the resources of Virginia, and Pennsylvania close at hand, was more important than New York, with its future bound up with the use of the Hudson and Mohawk valleys, in connection with the winning of the West; and Boston has always been restricted by the closeness of the Northern Mountains.

So we may conclude this book. The United States are safely embarked upon the achievement of their destiny—the development of the resources of the country for the benefit primarily of the people who steadily cross the seas to achieve independence of body and spirit in the new land of the West. Settler, colonist, American, each grew in power as he adapted the forces of nature to his service; and we leave the story of his progress at the point where he is bursting the bonds of the mountains which had until this time limited his endeavours to the coastal plains. Progress beyond the Appalachians opens a new era, and belongs to the age of steam and iron, the age of factories and ocean greyhounds. Nothing summarises the change so forcibly as the fact that the round voyage from Philadelphia to England and back occupied a third of a year, whereas to-day it occupies but a third of a month.

APPENDIX

I. POPULATION (IN THOUSANDS).

State	Estimated 1783	Census 1791	Increase %	Percentage of slaves in 1791
Mass. and Me. ...	350	475	36	—
R.I. ...	52	69	33	1
Conn. ...	206	238	16	1
N.Y. ...	200	340	70	6
N.J. ...	149	184	24	6
N.H. ...	82	141	73	—
Pa. ...	320	434	36	1
Md. ...	220	319	44	32
Va. ...	400	820	105	37
Del. ...	35	59	68	15
N.C. ...	200	429	115	25
S.C. ...	170	249	46	*

* Slaves not enumerated.

II. UNITED STATES EXPORTS.

Article	Per cent.	Chief States*
Flour ...	22	Pa. (42) Md. (22) Va. (12) N.Y. (12)
Wheat ...	7	Va. (46) N.Y. (21) Md. (17) Pa. (15)
Maize ...	5	Va. (33) Pa. (20) Md. (11) N.Y. (11)
Rice ...	8	S.C. (73)
Fish (a) ...	5	Mass. (73)
Meat (b) ...	2	Mass. (25) Conn. (25) N.Y. (16)
Indigo ...	2	S.C. (95)
Lumber (c) ...	6	Mass. (30) Va. (14) N.C. (13)
Tar and turpentine ...	1	Va. (27) N.C. (27) N.Y. (14)
Tobacco ...	21 (d)	raw, N.C. (55) Va. (25); manufactured, Mass. (94)
Others ...	21	
	100	

* The numbers in parentheses indicate the percentage which each State exported of the total United States export in that commodity.

(a) Dried and pickled; (b) beef and pork; (c) chiefly boards, staves and shingles; (d) tobacco of all kinds.

III. TONNAGE OF OVERSEAS SHIPPING (PER CENT.).

State in which the ports were situated		Nationality of ships			
		United States	Great Britain	Other foreign States	
Massachusetts	...	16	4	1	21
Pennsylvania	...	9	5	1	15
New York	...	6	4	4	14
Maryland	...	6	4	—	10
Virginia	...	5	7	1	13
Rhode Island	...	4	—	—	4
Connecticut	...	4	—	—	4
North Carolina	...	4	3	—	7
South Carolina	...	4	4	—	8
Others	...	2	2	—	4
		60	33	7	100

The total tonnage was about 750,000 tons, which is roughly equal to the tonnage of the port of Hobart in Tasmania at the present time. Of this tonnage 15 % and 4 % comprised coasting and fishing vessels respectively, so that the values in the table refer to 600,000 tons.

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